Deccan Policy of Mughals

Deccan Policy of the Mughals

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The Deccan policy of the Mughals was not determined by any single factor, but was instead guided by a range of considerations — including the strategic importance of the Deccan states, and the broader administrative and economic necessities of the Mughal Empire.

• Babur could not establish any meaningful contact with the Deccan, given his preoccupation with affairs in the North.
• Humayun, similarly, found little time to devote to Deccan affairs, being deeply involved in Gujarat, Bihar, and Bengal.
• It was Akbar who became the first Mughal emperor to actively seek the extension of Mughal suzerainty over the Deccan.

Babur

• At the time of Babur’s invasion of India, the Deccan comprised six Muslim states — Khandesh, Berar, Ahmadnagar, Bijapur, Golconda, and Bidar — alongside one major Hindu state, Vijayanagar, in the far South.
• According to Babur, Vijayanagar was the most powerful among all these states; he notes that Krishnadeva Raya (1509–1530 CE) was the greatest monarch of the Tuluva dynasty of Vijayanagar. Babur himself, however, could pay no real attention to the affairs of the South.

Humayun

• During Humayun’s reign (1530–40 CE), Muhammad Shah, ruler of Khandesh, supported Bahadur Shah of Gujarat against Mewar, and fought against Humayun at Mandsaur and Mandu.
• Humayun accordingly attacked Khandesh following his conquest of Gujarat. Muhammad Shah begged pardon, which Humayun duly granted — Humayun, in other words, had no genuinely planned policy toward the Deccan as such.
• This period marked only the beginning of Mughal rule in India, with the Afghans actively challenging Mughal authority across northern India — a pressure that kept both Babur and Humayun fully occupied in the North.

Under Akbar (1556–1605)

• After consolidating control over the North-Western frontier, Akbar turned his attention to the conquest of the Deccan and southern India, where disunity and continuous warfare among the various regional kingdoms offered a congenial political opening for an invader.
  • The Vijayanagar Empire had, until then, restrained the Muslim kingdoms of the Deccan from fighting one another; but following its fall after the Battle of Talikota in 1565 CE, the Muslim chieftains of the region devoted their energies and resources almost entirely to mutual warfare.
• Akbar was the first Mughal emperor to formally plan the conquest of the Deccan, driven by several motivations:
  • His primary objective was to expand his rule across the entire country.
  • He was deeply dissatisfied with the constant religious strife in the Deccan, and was keen to establish his ideal of Sulh-i-kul (universal peace) throughout the region.
  • He was equally troubled by the growing power of the Portuguese along the Indian sea-coast, who posed a rising threat to the Mughal Empire and were, moreover, harassing Haj pilgrims bound for Mecca — Akbar hoped that conquering the Deccan would help break the back of Portuguese power.
  • According to Abul Fazl, one further objective was to liberate the subject-peoples of the Deccan from the despotic rule of their local rulers, ensuring them peace and prosperity — though modern historians have generally given little credence to this particular justification.
• In 1591 CE, Akbar despatched four diplomatic missions from Lahore to Khandesh, Ahmadnagar, Bijapur, and Golconda, demanding that each accept his sovereignty. Only Khandesh complied; the remaining states all refused.
  • Ali Khan, ruler of Khandesh, later died fighting on the Mughal side against Ahmadnagar.
• Akbar then turned his attention to Ahmadnagar, which the Mughals attacked in 1593 CE. Chand Bibi, aunt of the reigning king Muzaffar of Ahmadnagar, fought bravely against the Mughal forces, though she was later either murdered or took her own life.
  • Ahmadnagar continued to resist nonetheless, and it was only after many years of prolonged struggle that the Mughals finally succeeded in capturing the territories and forts of Berar, Ahmadnagar, and Daulatabad.
• Miran Bahadur, son of Ali Khan, succeeded to the throne of Khandesh but refused to acknowledge Mughal suzerainty, ceasing payment of tribute.
  • The Mughals accordingly attacked Khandesh, captured the fort of Asirgarh in 1601 CE, and finally annexed the entire territory of Khandesh to the empire. Miran Bahadur was imprisoned in the fort of Gwalior, granted a pension for his upkeep.
  • During his own lifetime, however, Akbar failed to take any decisive action against Bijapur and Golconda.
• In sum, Akbar occupied Khandesh, captured a substantial part of Ahmadnagar’s territory along with several strong forts — Daulatabad, Ahmadnagar, Burhanpur, Asirgarh, and others — thereby not only establishing Mughal power firmly in the Deccan, but also paving the way for its further conquest by his successors.

Under Jahangir (1605–1627)

• Like his father, Jahangir remained committed to the conquest of the entirety of southern India. Akbar had conquered only a part of the Nizamshahi kingdom of Ahmadnagar, including its capital town — the larger portion of the state remained under the control of Nizamshahi nobles.
• Jahangir sought to fully annex Ahmadnagar, and to compel the rulers of Bijapur and Golconda to accept Mughal suzerainty as well. The Mughals, however, encountered tough resistance from Malik Ambar, the wazir of Ahmadnagar.
  • Malik Ambar improved Ahmadnagar’s economy, trained Maratha soldiers in guerrilla warfare, and fought aggressively against the Mughals — recovering, during the early period of Jahangir’s reign, the fort of Ahmadnagar along with some other lost territory.
• Although Jahangir deployed some of his most capable generals in the Deccan — including Khan-i-Jahan Lodi and Abdullah Khan — no lasting success was achieved, owing both to mutual differences among Mughal officers and to Malik Ambar’s continued success in opposing them.
• In 1617 CE, Prince Khurram attacked Ahmadnagar and forced it to sign a treaty by which it surrendered the fort of Ahmadnagar and the territory of Balaghat to the Mughals. Prince Khurram was conferred the title Shah Jahan by Jahangir at this very occasion — though this success proved, in reality, rather modest.
  • Ahmadnagar remained unwilling to accept lasting Mughal sovereignty, and soon resumed fighting.
  • In 1621 CE, peace was again concluded between the two, with Ahmadnagar surrendering a further portion of its territory to the Mughals and paying Rs. 18 lakh in cash.
  • Bijapur and Golconda, which had supported Ahmadnagar, also paid the Mughals Rs. 12 lakh and Rs. 20 lakh respectively.
• Thus, during Jahangir’s reign, Ahmadnagar was considerably weakened, and Bijapur and Golconda were placed under substantial pressure — yet there was, in the end, no genuine territorial extension of the empire, and no Deccan state was either fully eliminated or forced into complete submission.
  • Dr. R.P. Tripathi aptly observed: “It advanced the Mughal power no further than it had stood when Akbar left the Deccan.”

Under Shah Jahan (1628–1658)

• Shah Jahan’s Deccan policy continued the approach initiated by his ancestors, Akbar and Jahangir, seeking either to annex the Deccan kingdoms outright or force them to accept Mughal suzerainty. A capable commander, he understood the politics of the Deccan well.
• The death of Malik Ambar offered Shah Jahan a valuable opportunity to increase pressure on Ahmadnagar.
  • Fateh Khan, son of Malik Ambar, who succeeded him as wazir, proved incapable, corrupt, and disloyal both to his Sultan and to the state itself, pursuing instead his own selfish interests. He had Sultan Murtaza Nizam Shah II murdered, placing a child, Hussain Shah, on the throne in his stead — though he remained disloyal even to this puppet ruler, opening secret discussions with the Mughals while simultaneously attempting to court Bijapur’s friendship. His unprincipled diplomacy cost him the loyalty of many nobles, including Shahji Bhonsle, as well as the trust of both Bijapur and the Mughals.
  • He eventually surrendered Sultan Hussain Shah to the Mughals in 1633 CE. Hussain Shah was imprisoned at Gwalior, and Ahmadnagar was formally annexed to the Mughal Empire — marking the end of the independent state of Ahmadnagar, though Shahji Bhonsle continued resistance on behalf of another child claimant of the Nizamshahi dynasty, Murtaza III, before finally surrendering this child to the Mughals in 1636 CE and entering the service of Bijapur.
• Golconda: Muhammad Qutb Shah, Sultan of Golconda, died in 1626 CE, succeeded by his minor son Abdullah Qutb Shah, then just eleven and a half years old. In 1636 CE, Golconda was compelled to accept Mughal suzerainty.
  • When Aurangzeb was appointed governor of the Deccan in 1652 CE, he pressured Golconda for its failure to pay the annual tribute, steadily interfering in its affairs on various pretexts. His opportunity came when Mir Jumla, one of the Sultan’s most prominent nobles, quarrelled with the Sultan and sought Shah Jahan’s personal intervention to restore peace. Aurangzeb occupied Hyderabad and laid siege to the fort of Golconda — but before he could capture it, he received orders from Shah Jahan to lift the siege.
  • A treaty followed, by which Golconda accepted Mughal suzerainty, married one of the Sultan’s daughters to Prince Muhammad, son of Aurangzeb, and paid Rs. 10 lakh as dowry along with a further Rs. 17 lakh as war indemnity. Golconda, though weakened, thus retained its existence.
• Bijapur: Muhammad Adil Shah I ascended the Bijapur throne in 1627 CE, lacking any fixed strategy against Mughal pressure, while his nobles remained divided among themselves.
  • On 3 December 1631 CE, Shah Jahan ordered his Prime Minister, Asaf Khan, to invade Bijapur — an invasion that ultimately proved a failure.
  • The Mughals attacked again in 1636 CE, compelling Bijapur to finally accept their suzerainty, after which it enjoyed immunity from Mughal attack for roughly the next twenty years.
  • Adil Shah died in November 1656 CE. Believed to have no son, his wife Bari Sahiba nonetheless declared a child to be his heir, successfully installing him as Adil Shah II, then a youth of eighteen. Shah Jahan sought to exploit this uncertain succession, levelling various charges against Bijapur and ordering Aurangzeb to attack — Aurangzeb besieged the fort of Bijapur, but was again ordered by Shah Jahan to lift the siege before capturing it.
  • A treaty followed in 1657 CE, by which Bijapur accepted Mughal suzerainty and agreed to pay Rs. 1.5 crore to the Mughals; the forts of Bidar and Kalyani also passed into Mughal hands.
• Aurangzeb further compelled Shivaji to accept peace with the Mughals during this period.
• Thus, during Shah Jahan’s reign, Mughal Deccan policy achieved considerable success: Ahmadnagar was fully annexed, while Bijapur and Golconda were both forced to accept Mughal suzerainty, surrender portions of their territory and key forts, and pay both annual tribute and war indemnity.
  • Had Shah Jahan not personally restrained Aurangzeb, Bijapur and Golconda might well have been annexed outright at this stage. Shah Jahan, however, understood Deccan politics very well, likely judging that outright annexation of these two states would only complicate matters further for the Mughals — he seemed satisfied instead with weakening them and securing their formal acceptance of Mughal sovereignty.
  • Prince Dara Shukoh and Princess Jahan Ara also did not favour the elimination of these states, fearing it would only enhance Aurangzeb’s own power and prestige. Shah Jahan’s declining health, and the looming possibility of a war of succession among his sons, was likely a further reason behind the continued survival of these states at this juncture.

Under Aurangzeb (1658–1707)

Aurangzeb’s Deccan policy can be divided into two distinct phases:

Phase I (till 1680)

• The emperor himself did not personally lead operations in this phase; the role instead fell to various military generals deployed in the Deccan.
• Three principal concerns dominated Mughal attention throughout: the Marathas, the Qutb Shahis, and the Adil Shahis.
• The Treaty of Purandhar (1665) was concluded during this phase, between Jai Singh I as Mughal commander and Shivaji as the emerging Maratha power.

Phase II (1680 Onwards)

• Aurangzeb now personally travelled to the Deccan, taking direct charge of operations against the Deccani states.
• The same three concerns — Marathas, Qutb Shahis, and Adil Shahis — remained central throughout this phase.
• Aurangzeb’s sustained military campaigns culminated in the annexation of the Adil Shahis in 1686 and the Qutb Shahis in 1687.
• The Maratha ruler Sambhaji was executed in 1689.

Motivations Behind Aurangzeb’s Deccan Policy

• Aurangzeb’s Deccan policy was driven by a combination of political, economic, and religious motives:
  • Expansion of the Mughal Empire remained one core purpose; the elimination of Bijapur and Golconda was likely also seen as a necessary prerequisite for finally crushing Maratha power in the Deccan.
  • The continued existence of Shia rulers, despite their outward submission to the Mughal throne, remained a persistent irritant to Aurangzeb.
  • The Deccan states were also considerably wealthy, and Aurangzeb was clearly tempted by the prospect of capturing this wealth through conquest — mere acceptance of his suzerainty was no longer sufficient; he sought their outright annexation.
• During the first half of his reign (1657–81 CE), Aurangzeb remained largely occupied in Northern India, leaving Deccan affairs in the hands of various deputed nobles.
  • Bijapur had failed to fulfil the terms of the 1657 treaty, prompting Aurangzeb to depute Mirza Raja Jai Singh to attack it in 1665–66 CE — though he failed to secure Bijapur’s submission.
  • The situation shifted when Adil Shah II died in 1672 CE, succeeded by his four-year-old son, Sikandar Adil Shah. With the Sultan a minor, Bijapur’s nobles — divided between foreigners and Indian Muslims — competed for control of the throne, leading to serious mal-administration. The Mughals attacked Bijapur again in 1676 CE, but without result, and continued to fail in subsequent years, until Aurangzeb finally arrived in the Deccan in person.
• In 1681 CE, the rebellion of Prince Muhammad Akbar — who took shelter with the Marathas — brought Aurangzeb to the South in a fury. He reached the Deccan in 1682 CE, determined to destroy all the remaining states of the South.

Fall of Bijapur and Golconda

• Aurangzeb first despatched his son, Azam, against Bijapur. After fifteen months of heroic resistance, Bijapur finally collapsed and was annexed to the Mughal Empire on 22 September 1686 CE, bringing the Adil Shahi dynasty to an end; Sikandar Adil Shah was granted a pension.
• Abul Hasan Qutb Shah (1626–72 CE) was, at this time, the Sultan of Golconda. He had earlier purchased peace with the Mughals in 1657 CE by marrying his daughter to Prince Muhammad Sultan, Aurangzeb’s eldest son. A Shia himself, he had entrusted the administration of his state to two capable Brahmin ministers, Madanna and Akhanna, while immersing himself in the pleasures of harem life — he had also openly expressed displeasure at the Mughal occupation of Bijapur.
  • Dissatisfied with this state of affairs, Aurangzeb ordered Prince Shah Alam to attack Golconda. Abul Hasan fled Hyderabad, seeking shelter in the fort of Golconda, and pleaded for a treaty — the prince initially agreed, but Aurangzeb himself refused to countenance any such settlement.
  • Aurangzeb besieged the fort of Golconda in 1687 CE and captured it through strategy. Sultan Abul Hasan was made captive at the fort of Daulatabad, granted a lifetime pension, and Golconda was formally annexed to the Mughal Empire.

The Rise of the Marathas

• The conquest of Bijapur and Golconda did not, by itself, complete Aurangzeb’s conquest of the Deccan — the rising power of the Marathas under Shivaji remained a formidable challenge, Shivaji having already established an independent kingdom across Maharashtra.
• Shivaji first clashed with the Mughals in 1656 CE, attacking Ahmadnagar and Junnar — though Aurangzeb compelled him to accept peace in 1657 CE.
  • After consolidating his own hold on the throne, Aurangzeb appointed his maternal uncle, Shaista Khan, as viceroy of the Mughal Deccan, ordering him to attack Maratha territory while Shivaji remained engaged with Bijapur — but Shaista Khan failed in this task.
  • On 14 April 1663 CE, Shivaji carried out a daring exploit, launching a surprise night attack on Shaista Khan in his own sleeping chambers at Poona. Aurangzeb recalled Shaista Khan and deputed Raja Jai Singh against Shivaji instead, forcing him to sign the Treaty of Purandhar on 24 June 1665 CE, by which Shivaji surrendered three-quarters of his territory and forts.
• Shivaji visited Agra in 1666 CE, where he was effectively held prisoner — though he managed a daring escape on 29 August 1666 CE. He renewed his hostilities against the Mughals in 1670 CE, and celebrated a grand coronation ceremony at Raigarh on 16 June 1674 CE, formally assuming the title Maharaja Chhatrapati and proclaiming the establishment of a sovereign Hindu state. Shivaji died on 13 April 1680 CE, having by then succeeded in building a fairly extensive southern kingdom.
  • He was succeeded by his eldest son, Sambhaji, with whom Prince Akbar, Aurangzeb’s own rebellious son, found shelter. Sambhaji, however, proved an incompetent ruler. Aurangzeb, having reached the Deccan in 1682 CE, succeeded in capturing him — Sambhaji was executed on 21 March 1689 CE, and the whole of Maharashtra fell under Aurangzeb’s occupation, seemingly completing his conquest of the South.
• This success, however, did not endure. The Marathas soon rose as a unified force to liberate their homeland — the Maratha War of Independence, led first by Shivaji’s second son, Rajaram, and later by his widow, Tarabai.
  • Both Rajaram and Tarabai proved equal to the task before them: Rajaram a capable organiser, Tarabai a shrewd and effective diplomat. Following her husband’s death, Tarabai declared her infant son Shivaji II as ruler of the Marathas, continuing the fight against the Mughals.
  • The Muslim historian Khafi Khan, by no means sympathetic to the Marathas, wrote of her: “It was the result of her efforts that the Marathas started attacking not only the Subas of the Deccan but also the distant Mughal provinces and Aurangzeb failed to subdue the Marathas even till the end of his reign.”
• This prolonged conflict continued until Aurangzeb’s own death. Various Maratha chiefs organised their forces, employing guerrilla warfare against the Mughals and striking Mughal territory even well beyond Maharashtra, eventually succeeding in wresting Maharashtra back from Mughal control. Aurangzeb died in the Deccan, fully aware of his ultimate failure against the Marathas — his Deccan policy had, in the end, decisively failed.

Conclusion

• The Deccan policy of the Mughals reached the peak of its apparent success under Aurangzeb, yet this success ultimately proved temporary — Aurangzeb failed to consolidate his gains, and the resurgence of the Marathas brought about the collapse of his entire Deccan policy, contributing directly to the eventual disintegration of the Mughal Empire.
• Aurangzeb’s conquest of the South extended the boundaries of the Mughal Empire so vastly that effective administration from a single centre became practically impossible — Indian history had repeatedly demonstrated that attempts by northern rulers to permanently annex the South tended to fail, and this pattern was repeated once again under Aurangzeb.
  • In his determination to conquer and directly rule the South, Aurangzeb effectively neglected the North, the true source of his empire’s strength. While Aurangzeb and his best officers remained tied down in the Deccan wars, the North was left in the hands of comparatively junior and less capable officials.
  • Consequently, Mughal control over Northern India grew increasingly loose, while the continuous Deccan warfare steadily drained the imperial treasury — together, these factors contributed decisively to Aurangzeb’s failure and the broader decline of the Mughal Empire. It was, in the memorable phrase, the “Deccan Ulcer” that ultimately ruined Aurangzeb — his Deccan policy proving both misguided and impractical.
• The annexation of Bijapur and Golconda by Aurangzeb has itself been criticised as unwise, since it resulted in a direct confrontation between Aurangzeb and the Marathas, becoming a primary cause of his Deccan policy’s failure.
  • Jadunath Sarkar, however, offered a divergent view — arguing that the weakened Deccan states could neither function as an effective buffer between the Mughals and the Marathas, nor serve as reliable Mughal allies, meaning a confrontation between the two powers was, in his assessment, ultimately inevitable regardless.
• Under the later Mughals, the Deccan was ultimately lost to the empire altogether, and the Marathas rose to a position of clear regional ascendancy.

Assessment

• It is thus quite evident that personal whims or religious considerations did not, by themselves, dictate Mughal policy toward the Deccan states.
• Beginning with Akbar, the relationship between the Mughals and the Deccan states underwent several distinct shifts — best understood by examining the overall socio-economic and administrative situation of the Mughal Empire at each stage.
  • Akbar’s basic concern in the Deccan was to establish Mughal authority there and protect the vital “Surat hinterland.” Recognising that this objective could not be achieved through military conquest alone, he relied substantially on diplomacy.
  • Jahangir broadly favoured maintaining the position Akbar had achieved through the Treaty of 1600 CE in the Deccan, his reading of the regional situation and the empire’s internal problems both inclining him toward this cautious approach.
  • Ahmadnagar’s violation of the 1600 treaty compelled Shah Jahan to pursue a more aggressive policy against it, and the resulting Treaty of 1636 CE effectively settled the Deccan question for roughly the next twenty years. The growing expansion of Bijapur and Golconda into the Karnatak region, combined with the empire’s own financial pressures, later persuaded Shah Jahan to adjust his policy further.
  • Even Aurangzeb, who before his own accession had been a staunch advocate of a forward policy in the Deccan, was not initially inclined toward the outright conquest of Bijapur and Golconda. It was ultimately the rising power of the Marathas, fear of a potential alliance between the Marathas and Bijapur-Golconda, and the empire’s own internal crises, that finally compelled Aurangzeb to annex both states in the 1680s.
• All this demonstrates that Mughal Deccan policy was, at its core, shaped by the needs of the contemporary situation, rather than by the mere personal whims of individual rulers.
• Some historians have criticised the Mughal Deccan policy as fundamentally wrongly conceived, holding the empire ultimately paid a heavy price for it — though passing such a sweeping judgment would arguably be historically inappropriate.
  • Given the prevailing conditions in the Deccan — particularly the rise of the Marathas on one hand, and the entrenched enmity and mutual distrust among the Deccan states on the other — sustained Mughal intervention in the region appears to have been, in many respects, genuinely inevitable.
  • It is clear that Mughal rulers did carefully weigh the contemporary situation before each major step taken toward the Deccan states, with a range of factors shaping their overall approach. Their occasional failures in the Deccan stemmed not merely from any lack of understanding of the region’s problems, but equally from the factional strife among Mughal nobles and their own often questionable loyalty — factors equally responsible for the eventual fiasco of Mughal Deccan affairs.
• The Deccan policy of the Mughals is, therefore, best understood from a genuinely broader perspective, rather than being reduced to any single explanatory factor.