State subvention/funding may be an effective instrument in strengthening electoral democracy in India. Comment. (2017, 10 Marks)
State funding means public money for parties or candidates, given in cash or in kind (free airtime, material, premises). It is offered as a cure for India’s costly elections: the 2024 campaign cost about ₹1.35 lakh crore by one estimate, against a candidate ceiling of ₹95 lakh and no cap on party spending. The claim holds only if subvention comes with strict conditions.
The case for subvention
- It breaks dependence on “interested money”. Parties that rely on corporate and illicit donors repay them in policy. The electoral bonds scheme, struck down in ADR v. Union of India (2024), showed how opaque that dependence had become.
- A level field. When contesting is expensive, parties prefer rich or self-financing candidates. Milan Vaishnav, in When Crime Pays (2017), shows how this favours candidates with criminal records. Public money lowers the barrier for honest newcomers and smaller parties.
- Institutionalisation. Funding can be tied to audited accounts, disclosure and internal elections, making parties public-regarding bodies rather than private fiefdoms.
- Comparative precedent. Germany (since 1959) and the United States, whose presidential public funding began in 1976, subsidise politics. Uruguay and Costa Rica were early adopters in Latin America.
- Indian endorsements. The Indrajit Gupta Committee (1998) recommended partial state funding in kind, for recognised parties only. The Law Commission’s 170th (1999) and 255th (2015) Reports and the Second ARC (2007) supported it, but only alongside finance regulation and internal democracy.
The limits
- Addition, not substitution. Without a cap on party expenditure and enforced disclosure, public money simply tops up private money.
- Cartelisation. Richard Katz and Peter Mair‘s cartel party thesis (1995) warns that subsidies let established parties entrench themselves and turn into agents of the state.
- Allocation bias. Formulas based on past votes or seats favour incumbents. With about 2,050 registered unrecognised parties, the risk of abuse is real.
- Fiscal and moral objections. Taxpayers would finance parties they oppose, in a poor country.
What would make it effective
A conditional, partly in-kind model: free broadcast time and materials, and matching grants for small donations. Eligibility would depend on audited accounts, real-time disclosure, a party spending ceiling, candidates’ criminal antecedents being disclosed, and organisational elections verified by the Election Commission.
Conclusion
State funding can strengthen electoral democracy, but only as one part of a package. Given on its own, it would subsidise the existing system. Given together with spending limits, transparency and intra-party democracy, it can reduce the hold of corporate and criminal money on Indian politics.