Critically examine and comment on the assertion in about 200 words: Secularism in Indian politics is a myth. (2011, 20 Marks)
The charge of “myth” comes from opposite camps: T. N. Madan‘s critique of secularism as a westernised creed, the Hindu nationalist cry of pseudo-secularism, and liberal alarm at majoritarian drift. The question concerns politics, not the constitutional text: whether religion has actually been kept out of the calculus of power. The gap between norm and practice is wide, but “myth” overstates it.
The Case for the Assertion
- Religion as electoral currency. Section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act bars religious appeals, but Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo (1995) read Hindutva as a way of life, and even after Abhiram Singh (2017) appeals travel through symbol and dog-whistle. Abhijit Banerjee, Amory Gethin and Thomas Piketty find identity, not economics, driving Indian voting from 1962 to 2014.
- The secular parties’ own record. The Congress reversed Shah Bano by statute in 1986 and opened the Ayodhya gates the same year. Pratap Bhanu Mehta calls it vote-bank balancing that keeps every community insecure.
- Violence and impunity. Delhi 1984, Babri 1992 and Gujarat 2002 yielded commissions and few convictions. Paul Brass‘s institutionalised riot system shows riots are organised productions.
- The majoritarian turn. State participation in the Ayodhya consecration (January 2024), the CAA rules (March 2024) making religion a criterion for fast-track citizenship, anti-conversion laws in more than a dozen states, and only 24 Muslim MPs in 2024 (about 4.4 per cent) suggest a state drifting from neutrality.
- Theory. Madan’s Secularism in Its Place (1987) judged secularism in South Asia impossible as a shared credo, impracticable as a basis of state action and impotent against fundamentalism; Ashis Nandy and Partha Chatterjee add that it privileges the state and reforms Hindu institutions far more than others.
Why “Myth” Overstates
- The norm still sets the grammar of legitimacy. Opponents attack “pseudo” secularism in the name of a truer one, conceding the ideal. On 24 July 2025 the Law Minister told the Rajya Sabha the government had no plan to remove “secular” from the Preamble.
- Institutions bite. S. R. Bommai (1994) upheld dismissals of state governments after 1992; Balram Singh (2024) confirmed secularism as basic structure; interim orders of 12 December 2024 froze fresh suits against places of worship and of 15 September 2025 stayed parts of the Waqf (Amendment) Act.
- Pluralism persists. Most of India has never rioted, as Ashutosh Varshney shows through inter-communal civic ties, and minority votes stay pivotal in many states.
- The standard. Rajeev Bhargava‘s principled distance seeks the de-politicisation of religion, not its removal from public life; a contextual doctrine moves in zigzags. A gap between ideal and practice makes a norm unfulfilled, not fictional.
Conclusion
Secularism in Indian politics is not a myth but a contested and unfinished practice: firm in constitutional law, weakest in electoral competition, and weaker now than a generation ago. Myths are not litigated and fought over as this norm is. The real test is whether religious consolidation stops being the cheapest route to power; on that test the record is poor, but the standard stands.