Critically examine the role of Governor in recent times. (2016, 15 Marks)
The Sarkaria Commission (1988) called the Governor the “lynch-pin” of the state’s constitutional apparatus. After S. R. Bommai (1994) made wholesale dismissals of state governments risky, the office’s controversies moved: first to government formation, and in the last five years to obstructing legislation and administration in opposition-ruled states.
The recent record
- Formation and floor tests. In Arunachal Pradesh (2016) the Governor advanced the session unilaterally; Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016) quashed it. In Karnataka (2018) the Governor gave fifteen days to prove a majority, which the Supreme Court cut to one. In Maharashtra the 2022 floor-test call, made while disqualification petitions were pending, was held unjustified in Subhash Desai (2023).
- Withholding assent. Bills lay for years in Punjab, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and Telangana. State of Punjab (2023) and State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (April 2025) outlawed the pocket veto, and the latter added timelines and “deemed assent”. The advisory opinion of 20 November 2025 rejected both, keeping only a limited mandamus against indefinite delay.
- Addresses. Tamil Nadu’s Governor refused to read, or walked out of, the cabinet-drafted address (Art. 176) repeatedly from 2023. In January 2026 the Governors of Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Karnataka each refused or edited passages critical of the Union.
- Ministers. Tamil Nadu’s Governor “dismissed” a minister in June 2023 and retracted within hours. In 2024 he stalled another’s re-induction until rebuked by the Supreme Court. Karnataka’s Governor sanctioned the prosecution of Chief Minister Siddaramaiah (August 2024), a decision the High Court upheld.
- Universities. Vice-Chancellor deadlocks led the Supreme Court to set up search committees itself, under Justice U. U. Lalit for West Bengal (2024) and Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia for Kerala (2025).
The defence
Some of this has real constitutional footing. Reserving a doubtful bill is a textual power (Art. 200). Sanctioning prosecution against a self-interested cabinet was upheld in M.P. Special Police Establishment (2004). And Manipur (2025–26) saw Article 356 used orthodoxly, with the Assembly kept in suspended animation rather than dissolved.
Critique
- Selective activism. Confrontation clusters in states ruled by the Union’s opponents, which supports the charge that Governors act as agents of the Centre and turn discretion into a lever of bargaining federalism.
- Tenure. Office at the Union’s pleasure (Art. 156; B. P. Singhal, 2010) breeds dependence. The Punchhi Commission‘s (2010) call for consultation and fixed tenure lies unimplemented.
- Late remedies. Courts declare the Governor wrong but rarely undo the result; Uddhav Thackeray was never restored.
- Critics called judicial timelines a band-aid over provisions that depend on good faith. The 2025 opinion, by removing even that, left the wound open.
Conclusion
In recent practice the Governor has acted less as a neutral head than as a political actor in opposition-ruled states. The courts have closed the crude routes but left delay, speeches and university posts open. The 2026 changes of government will test whether the friction is structural. Either way, only depoliticised appointment and secure tenure can make the office neutral again.