Comment: The philosophy and Comment: Economic liberalisation in India administration of the distribution of powers between Centre and state is required to be re-assessed. (2016, 10 Marks)
India’s founders built what Alfred Stepan calls a “holding-together” federation. B. R. Ambedkar called it a Union because it is indestructible: no state may secede. That design answered the fears of 1947. Whether it still fits requires separating the philosophy from its administration.
The philosophy: a strong centre for a fragile nation
- Size and diversity made federation unavoidable. Partition, the integration of princely states, external threat and the planning ideal justified a unitary bias.
- The fear lasted well beyond 1950. Selig S. Harrison (India: The Most Dangerous Decades, 1960) doubted that the Union could survive linguistic regionalism. A strong centre was the insurance against that risk.
The administration: centralisation compounded
- Seventh Schedule tilt. The Union List dominates and residuary power lies with the Union (Art. 248). Parliament can override state jurisdiction through Arts 249–253.
- The 42nd Amendment (1976) moved education and forests, among other subjects, to the Concurrent List, and none has come back. NEET is the result.
- Agents of the Union operate inside the states: the Governor, Art. 356, the All India Services and central agencies.
- Fiscal drift. States raise under two-fifths of general-government revenue but carry about three-fifths of spending. Cesses and surcharges have shrunk the divisible pool to about 81% of gross tax revenue. Centrally sponsored schemes pre-commit state budgets through matching shares. Art. 293 gives the Union control over state borrowing.
Why reassessment is due
- The context has changed. The dangers Harrison predicted did not come to pass, and the reorganisation of states on linguistic lines strengthened national unity. Since 1991, investment decisions rest largely on state-level levers such as land, power and clearances.
- The reform agenda is unfinished. The Sarkaria Commission (1988) urged consultation on Concurrent List laws and an active Inter-State Council. The Punchhi Commission (2010) proposed “localised emergency” and regulating treaties that touch state subjects. The Council has not met since 2016.
- Fiscal voice. The 16th Finance Commission kept devolution at 41%, although eighteen states sought 50%, and it declined to cap cesses.
- A working alternative exists. GST created pooled sovereignty through a Council. Mohit Minerals (2022) held the Council’s recommendations persuasive, not binding.
Conclusion
The philosophy should be refined rather than discarded: a holding-together Union still needs reserve powers in border and conflict regions. It is the administration that needs rethinking — subsidiarity in legislation, a cap on cesses, codified norms for Governors and a functioning Inter-State Council. The aim is a strong Centre working alongside strong states.