Critically examine and comment on the assertion in about 200 words: It is not constitutional law but political factors that ultimately determine Centre-States relations in India. (2011)
The assertion echoes W. H. Morris-Jones, who read Indian federalism as “bargaining federalism” (The Government and Politics of India, 1964): the Constitution marks the outer limits, while the relationship itself is negotiated on terms set by the party system. It identifies what moves the relationship; “ultimately” goes too far.
The case for the assertion
- Same text, opposite behaviour. The basic division of powers has not been rewritten since 1950. Yet Article 356 was used routinely in one period and became almost unusable in another.
- The Congress system (1950–67). Rajni Kothari showed that federal quarrels were settled inside one dominant party, between the High Command and regional bosses, so conflict between governments rarely surfaced.
- Confrontation (1967–89). With non-Congress state governments and a party centralised after 1969, disputes became intergovernmental. The dismissal of nine state governments in 1977 and nine more in 1980 shows constitutional powers put to partisan use.
- Coalition federalism (1989–2014). Regional parties held the balance at the Centre. Balveer Arora described a drift from quasi-federal towards quasi-confederal.
- The present. “Double-engine” campaigns promise better delivery where one party rules at both levels. Withdrawals of general consent to the CBI have come mostly from opposition-ruled states. After 2024 the BJP (240 seats) has depended on the TDP and JD(U), and special packages for Andhra Pradesh and Bihar followed in the July 2024 budget.
Why “ultimately” overstates it
- Law built a floor. S. R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) made federalism a basic feature and the floor test mandatory. The mass dismissals of 1977 and 1980 never returned, even in a decade of single-party majority after 2014.
- Courts redraw the boundary. Mineral Area Development Authority v. SAIL (2024, 8:1) upheld the states’ power to tax mineral rights. Union of India v. Mohit Minerals (2022) held GST Council recommendations persuasive, not binding. State of West Bengal v. Union of India (July 2024) let a state’s suit over the CBI proceed under Article 131.
- Law can also restrain the states. The Presidential Reference opinion of 20 November 2025 held that courts cannot fix timelines for assent to bills and rejected “deemed assent”. This reversed the core of State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (April 2025). Doctrine, not party arithmetic, settled it.
- Structural interests cut across parties. Southern objections to delimitation cross party lines. The Constitution (131st Amendment) Bill was defeated on 17 April 2026 (298–230) because the two-thirds rule gave a cross-party bloc a veto. Politics worked through a legal rule.
- The design fixes a permanent tilt. The Union List and residuary powers, Article 3, the All India Services and Union consent to state borrowing (Article 293) all favour the Centre, whoever governs. Ivor Jennings called India a federation with a strong centralising tendency.
Conclusion
Politics sets the temperature of Centre–state relations. Law sets the boundaries and, since Bommai, a floor. Where a justiciable rule exists, such as the floor test or an Article 131 suit, the states’ sphere has held. Where only convention governs, as with assent and the Governor’s conduct, politics decides. The assertion is true of the variable that changes, not of the frame that contains it.