Discuss, in brief, the role of the National Commission for Women. Do you think it is a toothless organization?

Discuss, in brief, the role of the National Commission for Women. Do you think it is a toothless organization? (2019, 15 Marks)

The National Commission for Women (NCW), created by the NCW Act, 1990, is India’s apex statutory body for women’s rights. Calling it “toothless” is half right. It lacks the power to compel, but it does have teeth for inquiry, publicity and law-making, and it has often chosen not to use them.

Role in brief

  • Safeguard monitor. Under Section 10(1), it examines the working of constitutional and legal safeguards, reviews laws, and recommends amendments.
  • Complaint forum. It looks into complaints and takes suo motu notice of deprived rights and non-implemented laws. In these inquiries it enjoys civil-court powers under Section 10(4).
  • Law and policy shaper. Its inputs fed the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 and the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006. Section 16 requires the Centre to consult it on major policy matters.
  • Support and oversight. It funds litigation affecting large numbers of women, inspects jails and remand homes, and runs outreach through lok adalats and helplines.

Is it toothless?

Where the charge holds

  • Recommendatory findings. It cannot register an FIR, order a prosecution, award compensation or discipline an officer. Its civil-court powers help it gather facts but do not compel any remedy.
  • Executive capture by design. The Centre nominates every member and, under Section 4(3)(f), may remove one it thinks has “abused” office. Its budget and deputed staff come from the ministry it should scrutinise.
  • Manipur, 2023. A complaint about the sexual violence reached the NCW on 12 June 2023. The chairperson said she wrote thrice to state authorities without reply. The Commission became visible only after the video went viral in July.
  • Weak follow-through. The Parliamentary Committee on Empowerment of Women, chaired by Heena Vijaykumar Gavit (August 2023), found only about 62% of complaints since 2015–16 closed, and 1,554 of 2,056 NRI Cell cases pending. It also noted that no ministry works to a deadline on its recommendations.

Where it does not

  • Voice as accountability. Guillermo O’Donnell’s agencies of horizontal accountability often work through voice rather than sanction. Section 10(2) makes the government lay a memorandum before Parliament explaining why it rejected any recommendation.
  • Law as leverage. A recommendatory body rewrote enforceable law. It drove the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and has suggested amendments to about 161 laws.
  • Comparative evidence. Bodies such as the ECI and CAG built authority beyond their formal powers through assertive leadership. Sadhana Arya argues that the government limited the NCW by design and its members then narrowed it further. Its muted response to sexual violence in Gujarat in 2002, set against what critics call its brisk interventions in opposition-ruled states, lends weight to her view.

Conclusion

The NCW is blunt-toothed rather than toothless. It has real powers to inquire, expose and redraft law, but no power to compel. Much of its weakness is self-inflicted through partisan appointments. An independent selection committee and time-bound replies from ministries would sharpen it more than binding powers would.