Comment: “Whoever therefore out of a State of Nature united into a Commonwealth _must be understood to give up all the Power necessary to the Ends for which they united into Society, to the majority of the Community.” ·(Locke) (1997)
The sentence opens §99, in chapter VIII, “Of the Beginning of Political Societies”, of John Locke‘s Second Treatise of Government (1689). It is the hinge between unanimous consent, which creates society, and majority rule, which runs it. As an operating rule for a consent-based polity it is sound; its limits lie in the words “necessary to the ends”.
Locke’s Argument
- Unanimous foundation. Since men are free, equal and independent, none can be placed under political power without his own consent (§95).
- The physics of a body. A community must move one way, and that way is whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority (§96).
- Obligation. Consenting to form one body puts himself under an obligation to every one of that society to submit to the determination of the majority (§97). Otherwise each stays as free as in nature.
- Unanimity impossible. Sickness, business and differing opinions would make a society requiring everyone’s assent last no longer than Cato’s coming into the theatre, only to walk out (§98).
- Two qualifiers. Members may agree on any number greater than the majority (§99), and they surrender only the power necessary to the ends: the preservation of lives, liberties and estates. The majority may then place legislative power where it chooses (§132).
Why It Matters
- Against Hobbes. Thomas Hobbes also let the major part institute the sovereign (Leviathan, 1651, ch. 18), but then surrendered everything to it. Locke’s majority receives only a trust, and the community keeps a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative (§149).
- Towards democracy. Willmoore Kendall (John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority-Rule, 1941) read the chapter as making the majority the practical sovereign, even a Rousseauian collectivism; Jean-Jacques Rousseau himself held that, the original pact apart, the vote of the majority always binds all the rest (The Social Contract, 1762, IV.2).
Critiques
- Thin justification. Why the greater number is the greater force, or the better judge, is asserted rather than shown; the move is where Locke’s individualism strains.
- Tacit consent. Most people never consented expressly, so the dissenting minority is bound by a fiction; David Hume (“Of the Original Contract”, 1748) found the historical contract imaginary.
- Tyranny of the majority. Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America, 1835) and John Stuart Mill (On Liberty, 1859) saw that majorities oppress through opinion as well as law.
- Whose majority. C. B. Macpherson (1962) argued that Locke could trust the majority only because it meant the propertied.
The Indian Illustration
Ordinary laws pass by simple majority, while Article 368 requires special majorities, Locke’s number greater than the majority. Kesavananda Bharati (1973) placed the basic structure beyond any majority, reflecting “necessary to the ends”, and Articles 29–30 protect minorities. Navtej Singh Johar (2018) set constitutional morality above majoritarian sentiment. V-Dem’s 2026 report, contested by the government, again classes India an electoral autocracy: elected majorities need bounds.
Conclusion
Locke’s majority is delegated and limited, not sovereign. That qualifier makes the sentence the grammar of constitutional democracy: majorities decide, but only within the ends that justified the union.