Land Reforms programmes led to some constitutional amendments. Comment. (2025, 10 Marks)

The Constitution of 1950 held a redistributive command, Articles 39(b) and (c), alongside a justiciable property right, Articles 19(1)(f) and 31. Land being a State subject (Entry 18, List II), each state legislated zamindari abolition, tenancy and ceiling laws, and each collided with Part III in court. The statement understates the case: land reform was the single largest driver of constitutional amendment in India.

The Cycle: Statute, Strike-down, Amendment

AmendmentResponse
First (1951)Articles 31A, 31B and the Ninth Schedule (13 Acts), after the Patna High Court voided the Bihar Land Reforms Act in Kameshwar Singh
Fourth (1955)Adequacy of compensation made non-justiciable, answering Bela Banerjee (1954)
Seventeenth (1964)“Estate” widened to ryotwari land; 44 Acts added
Twenty-fifth (1971)“Compensation” became “amount“; Article 31C gave Articles 39(b)–(c) primacy
Twenty-ninth (1972)Kerala land reform Acts placed in the Ninth Schedule
Thirty-fourth (1974)Twenty more ceiling and tenancy laws immunised
Forty-fourth (1978)Property removed from Part III to Article 300A

Jawaharlal Nehru had told the Constituent Assembly in 1949 that where the community’s future was at stake, no judiciary can come in the way. Each amendment enacted that conviction.

The Judicial Counter-movement

  • Shankari Prasad (1951) and Sajjan Singh (1965) upheld the amending power over Part III.
  • Golaknath (1967), a challenge to Punjab’s land-tenure law, held Fundamental Rights beyond amendment.
  • Kesavananda Bharati (1973), brought by a Kerala math against land-ceiling legislation, restored the power but barred damage to the basic structure.
  • Waman Rao (1981) and I. R. Coelho (2007, nine judges) opened Ninth Schedule entries made after 24 April 1973 to basic-structure review. The schedule, grown to 284 entries and drifting far beyond land, was no longer a safe harbour.

Assessment

  • Achievement. Intermediaries were abolished across India, and the amendments settled that property yields to redistribution; the pre-1976 Article 31C still protects laws genuinely advancing Articles 39(b)–(c), as Property Owners Association (2024) confirmed.
  • Irony. The most redistributive programme the state attempted produced the doctrine that now limits the immunity which made it possible.
  • Gap between text and soil. Gunnar Myrdal‘s “soft state” fits: ceilings were evaded through benami transfers and litigation, and surplus distributed was small. Between 2009 and 2020, eleven states, Karnataka among them, relaxed ceiling laws to let non-farmers buy agricultural land, reversing the original logic.

Conclusion

Land reform did more than prompt amendments; it built the modern law of the amending power, from Article 31B to the basic structure. Constitutionally the programme largely won, since property is no longer a Fundamental Right; socially it largely stalled, because amendment could remove judicial obstacles but not political ones.