“The recent spate of judicial activities has created problems for the operation of parliamentary democracy in India.” Discuss. (1998)
The “spate” of the 1990s coincided with hung Parliaments, three Prime Ministers within a year and a run of corruption scandals. The charge that it hurt parliamentary democracy has substance, but it confuses symptom with cause — courts moved into a space a weakened Parliament had already vacated — and it overlooks where the Court strengthened the parliamentary system.
The spate
| Field | Intervention |
|---|---|
| Accountability | Court-monitored probes — the Jain hawala diaries and the Bihar fodder scam; Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1997) gave the CVC supervision over the CBI and fixed its Director’s tenure |
| Federalism | S. R. Bommai (1994) brought Article 356 proclamations under review |
| Appointments | Second Judges Case (1993) turned “consultation” into collegium primacy |
| Rights | Vishaka (1997) framed binding guidelines on sexual harassment |
| Environment | T. N. Godavarman (from 1996) suspended unplanned felling across the country; Delhi’s polluting industries shut and relocated |
Where the charge holds
- Accountability relocated. Parliamentary democracy rests on ministerial responsibility to the House. Through continuing mandamus, ministers and investigators came to answer to a bench rather than to the floor — an accountability without elections.
- Law-making by court. Vishaka legislated in substance; the Second Judges Case rewrote Article 124 so that the judiciary effectively appoints itself, eroding the functional separation recognised in Ram Jawaya Kapur (1955).
- Competence. The forest orders froze timber economies in the North-East, and the Delhi closures displaced thousands of workers — distributive choices made without the budgets, data or accountability of a legislature.
- Asymmetry. The Court judged every institution’s probity while answering to none; impeachment had just failed in the Justice V. Ramaswami case (1993).
The defence
- A constitutional mandate. Article 32 makes the remedy a fundamental right; Article 142 authorises complete justice; Vishaka was expressly interim, pending legislation.
- Filling a vacuum. Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph described the decade’s shift from an “interventionist” to a “regulatory” state, with the Supreme Court, Election Commission and President taking up ground that fragmented parties and a weak Parliament had abandoned.
- Repairing the parliamentary system. Bommai made the floor test decisive, protecting elected state governments from partisan dismissal.
- Restraint at the core. In P. V. Narasimha Rao v. State (1998) the Court held MPs immune under Article 105(2) even for bribes taken to vote — deference to Parliament’s own sphere to a fault.
Since 1998
The pattern deepened. The NJAC was struck down in 2015; Sita Soren v. Union of India (2024) overruled Narasimha Rao; a two-judge bench deemed ten Tamil Nadu bills assented (2025), before a Constitution Bench disowned deemed assent that November. Parliament’s decline also deepened: the 17th Lok Sabha referred only 16% of bills to committees, leaving scrutiny to whichever forum would supply it.
Conclusion
The judicial spate did create problems — accountability moved from the House to the courtroom, and judges made choices they cannot answer for. But the deeper problem for parliamentary democracy was Parliament’s own abdication. Activism is defensible only as an interim, vacuum-filling remedy; the lasting cure lies in a Parliament that legislates, scrutinises and holds ministers to account, leaving courts nothing to fill.