“Despite the differences between India and Pakistan on various issues, Indus Water Treaty has stood the test of times.” In the light of this statement, discuss the recent developments over this issue. (2017, 15 Marks)
The Indus Waters Treaty (Karachi, 19 September 1960), signed by Jawaharlal Nehru, Ayub Khan and the World Bank, gave the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India and the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan, leaving India run-of-the-river hydropower on the latter. It outlived 1965, 1971 and Kargil, but each decade since 2005 has tested it harder.
Why it stood the test
- Quarantine: water was kept apart from the rivalry; the Permanent Indus Commission met even in wartime.
- Graded dispute settlement (Article IX): Commission, then Neutral Expert for technical differences, then Court of Arbitration.
- Partition, not sharing: little needed joint management. Ramaswamy R. Iyer called it a partitioning treaty for this reason.
- Water rationality: Undala Z. Alam (2002) argued that both states needed assured supplies too badly to gamble with them, so cooperation was self-interested rather than friendly.
Recent developments
| Phase | Development | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| 2005–07 | Baglihar (450 MW, Chenab): Pakistan’s first resort to a Neutral Expert | February 2007 determination: design changes, but gated spillways upheld |
| 2010–13 | Kishenganga (330 MW): Pakistan said diversion alters the river’s course and starves its Neelum–Jhelum plant | 2013 awards upheld diversion with a minimum flow of 9 cumecs |
| 2016 | After Uri, Narendra Modi: “blood and water cannot flow together”; Pakistan sought a Court on Kishenganga and Ratle (850 MW), India a Neutral Expert as purely design questions | World Bank paused both tracks (December 2016) |
| 2022–25 | Bank appointed both (October 2022); India boycotts the Court; Neutral Expert affirmed his competence (January 2025) | Parallel, possibly contradictory rulings |
| 2023–24 | India’s notices seeking modification (January 2023, August 2024) | No negotiation followed |
| 2025 | After Pahalgam, treaty “in abeyance” (23 April 2025) | Data, inspections, Commission meetings stopped |
| 2026 | Court’s award (dated 31 August): treaty “remains fully in force“; interim order bars concreting Ratle’s dam wall above set levels pending the Neutral Expert (due July 2027) | India rejected it as an “illegally constituted” court |
Does the statement still hold?
- Partly. Flows continue because India lacks the storage to hold them back; what abeyance ends is information and process, and the treaty has no exit clause (Article XII).
- In Copenhagen School terms, water has been securitised. In Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner’s hydro-hegemony framework (2006), a containment regime has become leverage, which loses value once used.
- Costs to India: as a lower riparian demanding Brahmaputra data from China, and as a state that values third-party rulings elsewhere, India weakens its own arguments.
Conclusion
The treaty endured because both sides kept water out of the rivalry, not because either was satisfied. Since 2016, and decisively since 2025, that wall has cracked; survival now depends on terrorism, not hydrology. India’s stated aim is modification, not termination, so a renegotiation adding climate, storage and data provisions, with the Commission meeting again, remains the realistic way forward.