Critically examine India’s position on South China Sea Dispute. (2019, 15 Marks)
China claims most of the South China Sea within its nine-dash line (ten dashes on its 2023 map), against Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan and Indonesia’s EEZ. On 12 July 2016 an UNCLOS Annex VII tribunal in Philippines v. China found the line without legal basis; Beijing rejected the award. India is no claimant, but sea lanes, energy and Act East make its position a test of its rules-based order diplomacy.
India’s position
- Rules, not islands: India backs freedom of navigation and overflight, unimpeded commerce and settlement under UNCLOS, and takes no side on sovereignty over features. In 2016 it merely “noted” the award; since June 2023 its joint statements with the Philippines call for adherence to it.
- Credibility by example: India accepted the 2014 Bay of Bengal award, which largely favoured Bangladesh, a contrast with China’s rejection.
- The Code of Conduct: India insists the ASEAN–China Code must not prejudice the legitimate rights of non-parties (S. Jaishankar, 2021; Rajnath Singh, 2024), as Manila’s 2026 ASEAN chairship seeks to conclude it.
- Presence and partnerships: ONGC Videsh kept Vietnam’s Block 128 despite Chinese protests. India supplies BrahMos to the Philippines; Jaishankar in Manila (March 2024) said India “firmly supports” its sovereignty; ties became a strategic partnership during Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s visit (August 2025), alongside the navies’ first joint sail there.
- Inclusive framing: Narendra Modi’s Shangri-La address (2018) backed ASEAN centrality. The Quad statement of May 2026 criticised water cannons, ramming and the militarisation of disputed features without naming China.
Strengths
- Liberal-institutionalist: it upholds UNCLOS as a global public good that India also needs in the Indian Ocean.
- Realist: it is soft balancing, raising the reputational cost of Chinese coercion without a commitment India cannot sustain, and signalling that the sea cannot become a “Chinese lake”.
Critiques
- Too cautious: mostly declaratory. India runs no freedom-of-navigation operations, stays out of the US–Japan–Australia–Philippines “Squad”, and took seven years to move from “noting” to backing the award. Critics see deference shaped by the LAC and trade dependence on China.
- Reciprocity: China objects that India resists Chinese ships in the Indian Ocean yet operates in Beijing’s near seas. C. Raja Mohan (Samudra Manthan, 2012) shows each navy entering the other’s waters, so Indian activism invites Chinese access.
- Selective legalism: India’s UNCLOS declaration requires consent for foreign military exercises in its EEZ; the US FONOP west of Lakshadweep (April 2021) exposed the tension with its navigation stance.
- Limited capability: a navy stretched by its own ocean makes India a stakeholder, not a security provider, in Southeast Asia.
Conclusion
India’s position is principled and calibrated, and it has hardened since 2016 from noting the award to demanding adherence and backing Manila. The charge of caution is fair but misreads the aim: keeping the commons open and China legally accountable, not contesting islands. Credibility will turn on capability and consistent law-of-the-sea practice.