Identify the key sectors of cooperation between India and Israel since 2014. Examine their significance in strengthening the bilateral ties between the two countries. (2020, 15 Marks)
India and Israel became independent states within a year of each other but exchanged ambassadors only in 1992. After 2014 a relationship conducted discreetly was made public: Narendra Modi’s July 2017 visit, the first by an Indian Prime Minister, created a Strategic Partnership, and his February 2026 visit raised it to a Special Strategic Partnership for Peace, Innovation and Prosperity, with 17 agreements and 10 announcements. The sectors below carry that shift.
Key sectors of cooperation
| Sector | Main steps since 2014 |
|---|---|
| Defence and security | Barak-8/MRSAM co-development; Spike and Hermes production in Hyderabad; 2014 homeland-security and legal-assistance agreements; defence MoU (November 2025) |
| Agriculture and water | 35 Centres of Excellence operating and 8 more being set up; drip irrigation; an Innovation Centre for Agriculture (2026) |
| Science, innovation and cyber | I4F industrial R&D fund (2017); Cyber Policy Dialogue (2025); AI MoU and a Cyber Centre of Excellence (2026) |
| Space and health | Three ISRO agreements (2017); joint trials of rapid COVID-19 tests (2020) |
| Trade, finance and people | Haifa port takeover by an Adani-led consortium (2022); investment agreement (2025); FTA talks and a UPI–MASAV link (2026); labour mobility for up to 50,000 more workers |
Significance for the bilateral relationship
- Defence is the core. On SIPRI’s 2021–25 data, India took 29% of Israel’s arms exports and Israel supplied about 15% of India’s imports. Co-development makes the tie hard to unwind; Harsh V. Pant (2004) described a convergence of interests held in check by constraints that need careful management.
- Agriculture makes it domestically legible. More than a million Indian farmers have been trained at the Centres, giving the relationship a constituency no missile contract can.
- Complementarity. The 2026 joint statement pairs Israel’s innovation with India’s talent, scale and manufacturing; the two economies complete rather than compete.
- Diplomatic dividends. Israel gains weight from close ties with the world’s most populous democracy; India shifted some votes, as in the June 2019 ECOSOC vote denying observer status to a Palestinian NGO.
- Regional permission. The Abraham Accords (2020) reduced the Arab cost of closeness and made I2U2 (summit 2022) possible; the 2026 statement also linked Israel to IMEC.
- Future scope: joint design, joint R&D and joint exports to third markets.
Limits that temper the significance
- Trade is volatile: from US$10.77 bn (2022-23) it fell to US$3.75 bn (2024-25), because the peak rested on diamonds and a temporary petroleum surge, then the Red Sea crisis disrupted shipping.
- No shared principal adversary: Israel’s is Iran, India’s are Pakistan and China, so security ties stop short of alliance.
- The Gulf and Palestine constraint: India’s Gulf trade is roughly fifty times larger, and India voted for the New York Declaration (September 2025), which Israel opposed.
Conclusion
The sectors opened since 2014 have turned a covert supplier relationship into a public, multi-sector partnership whose core, defence and agro-technology, is now hard to reverse. Its commercial pillar remains thin, and the FTA talks are the attempt to build what the trade figures never contained.