“The Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship between India and Bhutan needs to be revised with more pragmatic, realistic obligations and responsibilities.” Comment. (2017, 10 Marks)
The instrument is the Treaty of Friendship signed at Darjeeling on 8 August 1949, whose first article declares “perpetual peace and friendship”. It carried over the 1910 Punakha bargain: India would not interfere in Bhutan’s internal administration, and Bhutan would be “guided by the advice” of India in external relations. The real question is whether a treaty already revised once needs revising again.
What 1949 provided and 2007 changed
- 1949: non-interference, guidance on external affairs (Article 2), arms imports with Indian assent, free trade and transit, and extradition. India also returned Dewangiri.
- 2007 revision (8 February): the guidance clause was replaced, not deleted. The new Article 2 commits both sides to cooperate closely on national interests and bars either from letting its territory be used against the other’s security. Bhutan may import arms through India if its intent is friendly.
- A protectorate-like text became a partnership of sovereign equals, reflecting the political maturity of a kingdom a year away from constitutional monarchy (2008), while India’s security core survived and became reciprocal.
The case for further revision
- Asymmetry: Bhutan’s security commitment is written; India’s guarantee is only implied. Robert O. Keohane’s “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas” (1969) explains why small states value precisely such written obligations.
- Unwritten economics: hydropower tariffs, Indian cross-border electricity trade rules and debt (hydropower debt was about 56% of GDP in mid-2025) sit outside the treaty, where Indian regulation can change them unilaterally.
- China: Bhutan’s boundary talks (25 rounds; a Three-Step Roadmap, 2021; expert-group meetings into 2026) bear directly on the Doklam trijunction and the Siliguri Corridor, yet the treaty has no consultation mechanism.
The case against
- The treaty is short and elastic. Practice has moved around it through trade (2016), hydropower (2006) and development agreements, such as the ₹10,000 crore pledge for Bhutan’s 2024–29 plan.
- Reopening it during a live China negotiation could cost India the 2007 security clause. Operation All Clear (2003) and Doklam (2017) show that the obligation already works.
Conclusion
The statement is half right. Obligations need to be more pragmatic, but through the machinery beneath the treaty rather than its text. The Dorjilung project (60% Druk Green, 40% Tata Power, World Bank-financed in 2026) shows how commercial finance can replace sovereign debt, while rail links and Gelephu Mindfulness City add new obligations of delivery. As 2007 proved, the partnership is evolving, not permanent; India must keep adjusting it so that “Bharat for Bhutan, Bhutan for Bharat” stays a reciprocal bargain.