In normal conditions, the Governor is a constitutional executive but in case of constitutional crisis, he can become a powerful and effective executive. Discuss. (2011, 30 Marks)
The framers carried the Westminster dual executive into the states: the Governor heads the state and the Chief Minister governs it. B. R. Ambedkar called the discretion clause in Article 163 “a very limited clause”. Yet it is precisely this residue that comes alive when no ministry can govern, or when the ministry is itself the problem. The statement holds, but the courts have steadily narrowed what “effective” can mean.
Normal conditions: a head who signs, not decides
- Article 154 vests executive power in the Governor, but Article 163(1) binds him to ministerial aid and advice “except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions … in his discretion”.
- Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974, seven judges) held the President and Governor alike to be formal heads acting on advice, save in a few exceptional situations.
- Ordinances (Art. 213), summoning (Art. 174), pardons (Art. 161) and the annual address (Art. 176) are thus the ministry’s decisions.
Crisis: where his own judgement enters
Unlike Article 74 for the President, Article 163(2) makes the Governor’s view of what is discretionary final. This is the textual root of the “effective executive”.
| Crisis | Why advice fails | Governor’s decision |
|---|---|---|
| Hung assembly | No ministry exists | Whom to invite, when to test (Sarkaria order of preference, 1988) |
| Majority lost | Advice is self-interested | Floor test; dismissal if refused |
| Breakdown | Government cannot function | Art. 356 report; then administers as President’s agent |
| Doubtful bill | Legality in question | Reservation for the President (Art. 200) |
| Biased cabinet | Ministers judge own case | Prosecution sanction (M.P. Special Police Establishment, 2004) |
The Constitution also creates special responsibilities: individual judgement on law and order in Nagaland (Art. 371A) and Arunachal Pradesh (Art. 371H), mining-royalty disputes with district councils (Sixth Schedule, para 9), and administering an adjoining Union Territory (Art. 239(2)).
The counter-view: crisis power fenced in
- S. R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) held that majority is tested on the floor, not in Raj Bhavan, and that proclamations are reviewable.
- Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006) voided the Bihar dissolution, which rested on a mere apprehension of horse-trading. Art. 361 immunity protects the person, not the act.
- Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016) called the discretion narrow and reviewable, and it quashed the Arunachal Governor’s unilateral advancing of the session.
- Floor tests were compressed to a day in Karnataka 2018. In Subhash Desai (2023) the Court found that Maharashtra’s 2022 floor-test call lacked objective material: intra-party dissent is not loss of confidence.
- On assent, State of Punjab (2023) ended the pocket veto. The November 2025 advisory opinion rejected judicial timelines but kept a limited mandamus against indefinite inaction.
Often the crisis has been manufactured through this very discretion: N. T. Rama Rao‘s dismissal (1984), Bihar 2005 and Arunachal 2016. Tenure at the President’s pleasure (Art. 156; B. P. Singhal, 2010) invites Union influence. The Punchhi Commission (2010) therefore demanded that discretion be exercised with reason and good faith, and that Governors be removable only by a state legislature’s resolution.
Conclusion
In a crisis the Governor is effective only as an umpire. His discretion is procedural: to convene the House, return a bill, or report a genuine breakdown so that constitutional processes can decide. He is not meant to decide in their place. Timing and tenure remain the weak points. Until appointment and removal are depoliticised, the crisis power will be trusted only as far as the courts police it.