Does the functioning of the federalism in India tend to make it appear as a unitary state in practice? (2020, 20 Marks)
K. C. Wheare called the Indian Constitution “quasi-federal”: in his view it was a unitary state with subsidiary federal features. B. R. Ambedkar had already told the Constituent Assembly (4 November 1948) that it could be “both unitary as well as federal according to the requirements of time and circumstances”. In certain periods the working of the system does make India look unitary. The appearance, however, misreads the substance.
A design that allows a unitary switch
- Emergency provisions. Under Art. 352 read with Arts 250 and 353, Parliament can legislate on State List subjects and the Union can direct the states. Art. 356 suspends a state government, and Art. 360 allows control over state finances.
- Art. 3. Parliament can alter or abolish a state without its consent. In 2019 Jammu and Kashmir was reduced to two Union Territories, the first time a state was downgraded.
- Legislative entry. Arts 249–252 let Parliament legislate on state subjects. Residuary power lies with the Union (Art. 248), and Union law prevails in the Concurrent List.
- Integrating instruments. India has a single citizenship, an integrated judiciary, the All India Services (Art. 312), an appointed Governor (Arts 155–156) and Union directions to states (Arts 256–257, 365).
Functioning that sharpens the unitary look
- Art. 356 was used freely against opposition governments, including the dismissal of nine state governments in 1977 and nine more in 1980. Its total use is around 134.
- The Governor as a Union agent. In the Maharashtra crisis of 2022 the Governor called a floor test while disqualification petitions were pending. Subhash Desai (2023) held that call unjustified in law. Delays in assenting to bills survived the Presidential Reference opinion of 20 November 2025, which ruled out court-fixed timelines.
- Fiscal dependence. States raise under two-fifths of general-government revenue but carry about three-fifths of spending. Cesses have cut the divisible pool to about 81% of gross tax revenue. Scheme funds can be conditional: in 2025 Tamil Nadu sued the Union over Samagra Shiksha funds withheld because it would not adopt the PM SHRI scheme linked to NEP 2020.
- Dominant-party nationalisation. In the Congress system described by Rajni Kothari, and in what Suhas Palshikar calls a “BJP system”, one party sets a national agenda. “Double-engine” campaigning presents state autonomy as an obstacle to delivery.
Why the appearance misleads
- States remain governments. Granville Austin argued that a strong centre need not produce weak provinces that act as mere agents. States legislate on police, land, agriculture and health and implement most national policy. Their resistance forced the repeal of the farm laws in 2021.
- A judicial floor. S. R. Bommai (1994) made federalism a basic feature, and Art. 356 has not been used freely since. Mineral Area Development Authority v. SAIL and State of UP v. Lalta Prasad Vaish (both 2024, nine judges, 8:1) upheld state powers of taxation and regulation. Mohit Minerals (2022) held GST Council recommendations non-binding.
- Plural politics. Regional parties govern major states; in 2026 the TVK won Tamil Nadu. Since 2024 the Union has depended on the TDP and JD(U). The states’ bloc defeated the 131st Amendment Bill on 17 April 2026.
- Asymmetry. Art. 371 and the Sixth Schedule show a centre that accommodates diversity rather than imposing uniformity.
Conclusion
India looks unitary when a single party dominates and when emergency powers are used. It works federally when politics is competitive and the courts hold the line. Ivor Jennings‘s description — a federation with a strong centralising tendency — fits better than “unitary state”. The tendency is one of degree, set by politics, and has not changed the kind of state India is.