Explain the ‘federal scheme’ under the Government of India Act, 1935. Why could this scheme not be implemented?

Explain the ‘federal scheme’ under the Government of India Act, 1935. Why could this scheme not be implemented? (2005)

The Government of India Act, 1935, the longest statute Parliament had then passed, proposed an All-India Federation joining British India’s provinces with the princely states. Unlike classical federations such as the American, which arose from a compact among equal units, it was a federation by devolution from a unitary imperial centre, with autocratic states bolted on. Provincial autonomy began in 1937; the federal half never did.

Part I: The federal scheme

Units and entry

  • Units were the Governors’ Provinces and Chief Commissioners’ Provinces, plus princely states that signed an Instrument of Accession. Provinces joined automatically; states’ entry was voluntary.
  • Under Section 5, the Federation could be proclaimed only after states entitled to at least 52 of the 104 states’ seats in the Council of State, and holding half the states’ population, had acceded.

Division of powers

  • Three lists — Federal (59 items), Provincial (54) and Concurrent (36) — with residuary powers vested in the Governor-General, not in either legislature.

Federal government

  • Dyarchy at the centre: defence, external affairs, ecclesiastical affairs and tribal areas reserved to the Governor-General; other federal subjects handled by ministers responsible to the legislature, subject to his “special responsibilities” and discretion.
  • Bicameral legislature: Council of State of 260 (104 for states) and Federal Assembly of 375 (125 for states); states’ members were nominated by rulers, British Indian members largely elected (the Assembly indirectly, by provincial legislatures).
  • A Federal Court (functioning from 1937) to adjudicate disputes between units.

Part II: Why it was never implemented

  • The princes held the key and refused to turn it. Rulers feared erosion of internal sovereignty, disliked the financial terms, and wanted guarantees on paramountcy. Over-representation — roughly two-fifths of the upper house for about a quarter of the population — did not overcome their suspicion of democratic provinces; the Section 5 threshold was never met.
  • Congress opposition. Congress rejected the federal part (Faizpur 1936, Haripura 1938): princely nominees would act as a conservative bloc against elected Indians, reserved subjects kept real power British, and the Governor-General’s safeguards made responsibility hollow. Jawaharlal Nehru called the Act a machine with strong brakes but no engine.
  • Muslim League opposition. The League accepted provincial autonomy but rejected the federal scheme, fearing a Hindu-majority centre; after the 1937 elections Muhammad Ali Jinnah moved towards the separatist demand of 1940.
  • British ambivalence. Princely entry was valued chiefly as a counterweight to nationalism, and negotiations dragged on.
  • The Second World War. When war came in September 1939, the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow suspended federal negotiations. After 1940 the Pakistan demand and the Cripps and Cabinet Mission proposals made the 1935 federation obsolete.

Significance

The unimplemented scheme was the blueprint for 1950: the three lists became the Seventh Schedule, the Federal Court became the Supreme Court, and the Governor’s powers over assent survived in Articles 200–201. The Supreme Court’s advisory opinion of 20 November 2025, declining to set judicial timelines for Governors’ assent to Bills, shows the 1935 design still generating federal friction.

Conclusion

The federal scheme failed because it tried to federate unequals — elected provinces and autocratic states — under an unaccountable centre, satisfying neither princes, Congress nor League. Its architecture outlived it; its political premise did not.