Examine the place of ‘obligation’ in political theory. (1995)
Political obligation is the moral duty to obey the law and support the state. It differs from obedience, which fear alone can secure. The question why should I obey? is the hinge of political theory, since rights, resistance and democracy follow from the answer. In Plato’s Crito, Socrates refuses to escape because a lifetime in Athens has bound him to its laws.
Classical answers
| Theory | Ground of obligation | Thinkers | Weakness |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divine right | Rulers hold authority from God | Robert Filmer, Patriarcha | Refuted in John Locke’s First Treatise |
| Social contract | We agreed to it | Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan, 1651), Locke (Second Treatise, 1690), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (The Social Contract, 1762) | Almost no one consents expressly |
| Utilitarian | Obedience maximises general welfare | Jeremy Bentham | Lapses whenever disobedience pays better |
| Idealist | The state realises our rational will | T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (delivered 1879–80) | Risks equating real will with state will |
For Hobbes, obligation lasts only while the sovereign protects life; for Locke, it ends when government breaks its trust; Rousseau binds citizens to the general will. Locke fell back on tacit consent, inferred from residence. David Hume (“Of the Original Contract”) compared the resident to a man carried aboard ship asleep, who can leave only by leaping into the sea. Green moved from consent to purpose: will, not force, is the basis of the state, which secures conditions for moral self-development.
Modern re-examination
- Fair play: H. L. A. Hart (“Are There Any Natural Rights?”, 1955) held that beneficiaries of a rule-governed cooperative scheme owe others the same submission. John Rawls developed this in 1964, later preferring a natural duty of justice to support just institutions (A Theory of Justice, 1971). Robert Nozick objected that unsought benefits create no duty.
- Philosophical anarchism: Robert Paul Wolff (In Defense of Anarchism, 1970) found moral autonomy irreconcilable with any claim of authority. A. John Simmons (Moral Principles and Political Obligations, 1979) showed that no theory explains why one is bound to one particular state. Both deny a general obligation, but not every reason to obey just laws.
- Marxist: for Karl Marx, obedience reflects class domination; Antonio Gramsci explained it as hegemony, which manufactures consent.
Gandhi and the Indian illustration
M. K. Gandhi made obligation conditional on conscience. Unjust law may be met with non-violent civil disobedience if the penalty is accepted. At his 1922 sedition trial he said that affection cannot be manufactured or regulated by law. B. R. Ambedkar set the limit on 25 November 1949: once constitutional methods exist, civil disobedience is the grammar of anarchy. The Supreme Court put Section 124A (sedition) in abeyance on 11 May 2022. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (in force July 2024) dropped the word, but its Section 152, on endangering sovereignty, now faces the same challenge.
Conclusion
Obligation is central to political theory because it turns power into authority and marks where that authority ends. Since the anarchist critique, few theorists defend an unconditional duty to obey. The defensible position is a prima facie obligation to just, democratic institutions that leaves room for principled dissent.