Comment: Ethnic separatism. (1995, 20 Marks)
Ethnic separatism is the demand of an ethnically defined group, claiming a territory as its homeland, to leave the existing state and form its own or join another. Walker Connor called the loyalty behind it ethnonationalism — allegiance to the ethnic nation rather than to the state. It differs in kind from autonomy: an autonomy movement renegotiates the terms of membership, while a separatist movement rejects membership itself. In India it has recurred but never succeeded.
Why groups choose exit
- Donald L. Horowitz (Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 1985) found secession most frequent among backward groups in backward regions. They fear discrimination and have little economic stake in staying. Advanced groups in advanced regions may feel milked, but exit costs them too much. He later warned that a general right to secede produces new trapped minorities.
- Paul R. Brass (Ethnicity and Nationalism, 1991) treats separatism as an elite project. Leaders select cultural markers to turn an ethnic category into a nation, choosing exit when no route to power exists inside the system.
- Geography decides whether separatism can last. India’s separatist movements arose on the periphery: near cross-border sanctuary, in hills the colonial state had ruled as frontier.
The Indian cases
| Movement | Claim | State response | Status, 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Naga (NNC 1946; NSCN 1980) | Sovereignty; Nagalim | AFSPA 1958; statehood 1963; ceasefire 1997; Framework Agreement 2015 | Unconcluded over flag and constitution |
| Mizo (MNF, 1966) | Independence | Air strikes, village grouping; Accord 1986 | Settled; statehood 1987 |
| Khalistan (1980s) | Sovereign Sikh state | Operation Blue Star 1984; Punjab Accord 1985 | Armed phase over; diaspora residue; Amritpal Singh elected MP 2024 while detained |
| Kashmir (1989) | Azadi or Pakistan | AFSPA 1990; Article 370 abrogated 2019 | Union Territory; elected government since October 2024; statehood pending |
| ULFA (1979) | Sovereign Assam | Army operations from 1990 | Pro-talks accord December 2023; ULFA-I outside |
The state’s response: coercion and accommodation
Brass’s first rule of Union practice is that secession is never negotiated. Once armed capacity is broken, generous terms follow within the Constitution. Force has ended insurgencies; only federal accommodation has ended the grievances behind them.
- The Mizo Accord (30 June 1986) is the success case. The MNF renounced secession and surrendered arms. Mizoram gained statehood and Article 371G protection for customary law and land. Laldenga became Chief Minister, and there has been no insurgency since. The claimant was compact and homogeneous, its leader could bind the movement, and the demand fitted existing boundaries.
- The Naga case lacks every one of these conditions. The movement is split into factions, the Nagalim claim cuts into three states, and each settlement breeds a faction that rejects it.
- Coercion is costly. After the Oting killings of December 2021 left fourteen civilians dead, the Supreme Court closed the proceedings in September 2024 because the Union refused sanction under AFSPA. Atul Kohli contrasts the accommodation of Tamil nationalism with the coercive handling of Punjab and Kashmir.
Assessment
Ryan D. Griffiths counts India among the world’s most secession-prone states. The count is accurate; the inference is not. India hosts many such movements because it lets demands be voiced, yet none has seceded. Pakistan lost its eastern wing and Sri Lanka fought a civil war over what India absorbed. The trend runs from exit toward internal self-rule: the Kuki-Zo demand in Manipur is for a separate administration, not a separate country.
Conclusion
Indian ethnic separatism is best read as an extreme bargaining position that the federal order usually converts into a claim for autonomy. It survives as a residue — ULFA-I, Naga factions, militancy in Kashmir. Where the Union met the underlying demand, as in Mizoram, peace has lasted; where it delayed, conflict has outlived grievance.