Discuss the nature of reforms of the electoral process in India and explain the further scope for reforms. (2014, 20 Marks)
India’s electoral reforms have been incremental, reactive and largely non-legislative: the Election Commission and the Supreme Court drove most of them, and Parliament acted mainly under pressure. As a result, reforms of procedure and inclusion have gone far, while reforms that would constrain the parties themselves, on money, criminality and internal democracy, remain unfinished.
Nature of the reforms: three drivers
| Driver | Key reforms |
|---|---|
| Parliament | 52nd Amendment (1985) anti-defection law, tightened by the 91st (2003); 61st Amendment (1988) lowering the voting age from 21 to 18; s.61A RPA (1988) authorising EVMs; the 1996 amendments limiting a candidate to two seats; the 2003 Act making donations to parties tax-deductible and giving recognised parties free airtime; the exit-poll ban (s.126A, 2009); the Election Laws (Amendment) Act 2021 (voluntary Aadhaar–EPIC linking, four qualifying dates a year) |
| Judiciary | Candidate disclosure of assets and criminal cases (ADR, 2002; PUCL, 2003); Lily Thomas (2013): immediate disqualification on conviction; NOTA (PUCL, 2013); VVPAT (Subramanian Swamy, 2013); Anoop Baranwal (2023) on appointments; the Electoral Bonds Scheme struck down (ADR, Feb 2024) |
| Election Commission | Photo identity cards (EPIC) from 1993; T. N. Seshan‘s enforcement of the Model Code; expenditure observers; nationwide EVMs (2004); SVEEP voter education; cVIGIL; the Special Intensive Revision of rolls, upheld by the Supreme Court in May 2026 |
Four features stand out:
- Integrity and inclusion first. EVMs ended booth capture, and EPIC and indelible ink curbed impersonation. Turnout reached 66.1% in 2024, with women out-voting men.
- Disclosure, not prohibition. Voters know candidates’ assets and cases, but little bars them from standing; MPs with declared criminal cases rose from 23% (2004) to 46% (2024).
- Courts compelled; Parliament resisted. Parliament tried to undo disclosure in 2002, which PUCL struck down, and drafted an ordinance against Lily Thomas, later withdrawn. The 2023 appointment Act replaced the Chief Justice with a Cabinet Minister on the selection panel.
- Technology-led administration. In 2025–26 the ECI introduced webcasting at all polling stations, colour candidate photographs on ballot units, the ECINET platform and a cap of 1,200 electors per polling station.
Further scope for reform
- Money power. There is still no ceiling on party expenditure. Explanation 1 to s.77 RPA keeps party spending out of the candidate’s account. Since the bonds ruling, money has moved through electoral trusts, with the BJP receiving about 82% in FY25. Needed: a party spending cap, real-time disclosure, and conditional state funding tied to audits, as the Indrajit Gupta Committee (1998) and the Law Commission’s 170th and 255th Reports proposed.
- Criminalisation. The Law Commission’s 244th Report (2014) proposed disqualification once charges are framed, with safeguards against political prosecutions. Special courts must deliver time-bound trials.
- Intra-party democracy. Mandatory organisational elections and audited accounts, and an ECI power to deregister parties, which INC v. Institute of Social Welfare (2002) held it lacks.
- Independence of the ECI. Equal removal protection for all Commissioners, an independent secretariat and expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund.
- Inclusion. Remote voting for domestic migrants (the ECI’s 2023 prototype), a totaliser protecting booth-level secrecy, and accessibility for disabled voters.
- Information integrity. Make paid news an electoral offence; regulate deepfakes.
- Structural questions. One Nation One Election (the 129th Amendment Bill is still before a JPC); delimitation and women’s reservation, stalled after the 131st Amendment Bill failed in April 2026; and safeguards so that roll revisions do not disenfranchise the poor.
Conclusion
India has perfected the mechanics of elections but not their political economy. The next generation of reforms must discipline money, criminality and party oligarchy. Because that requires legislators to regulate themselves, the realistic path is continued judicial and ECI pressure combined with an independent, well-resourced Commission.