“The success of electoral democracy can partly be attributed to the status and role of the Election Commission of India.” Explain. (2021, 20 Marks)
India has held eighteen Lok Sabha elections, seen power change hands peacefully at the Centre several times, and watched participation widen rather than narrow. The Election Commission of India (ECI) explains much of this. Its status gives it authority, and its role has turned that authority into public trust. The word “partly” matters, though: voters, parties, courts and civil society co-produced the outcome.
Status: where the authority comes from
- Constitutional, not statutory. Article 324 vests superintendence, direction and control of elections in the ECI. Mohinder Singh Gill (1978) read this as a reservoir of power for situations the law does not cover.
- Insulated process. Article 329(b) and N. P. Ponnuswami (1952) bar courts from interrupting an election midway, so the Commission runs the process and disputes wait for an election petition.
- Security of tenure. The CEC can be removed only like a Supreme Court judge, and service conditions cannot be varied to his disadvantage (Art. 324(5)). T. N. Seshan v. Union of India (1995) made the body collegial, deciding by majority.
- Quasi-judicial and advisory reach. Under the Symbols Order, 1968 it decides which faction of a split party keeps the name and symbol, as with the Shiv Sena (2023) and the NCP (2024). Its opinion on disqualifying legislators binds the President under Art. 103 and the Governor under Art. 192.
Tarunabh Khaitan calls such bodies guarantor institutions: they protect a norm the elected cannot be trusted to enforce against themselves.
Role: how status became democratic success
- Inclusion. Rolls, photo identity cards and SVEEP voter education sustained what Yogendra Yadav called the second democratic upsurge: from the 1990s, Dalits, OBCs, women and rural voters voted in larger numbers than elites. In 2024 the electorate approached 98 crore.
- Level playing field. T. N. Seshan turned the Model Code of Conduct into a working restraint on incumbents, and expenditure observers followed.
- Integrity of the vote. EVMs ended booth capture, and VVPAT added verifiability. In ADR v. Election Commission of India (April 2024) the Supreme Court refused a return to paper ballots.
- Accepted outcomes. Incumbents lost and handed over power in 1977, 1989, 2004 and 2014. S. Y. Quraishi calls this logistical feat “an undocumented wonder”.
Why only “partly”
| Other contributor | Contribution |
|---|---|
| Voters | High turnout among the poor gives elections legitimacy; Sunil Khilnani stresses how deeply the democratic idea entered popular imagination |
| Parties | Losers accepting defeat, a norm set in the Congress-system decades |
| Judiciary | Candidate disclosure (ADR, 2002), NOTA (PUCL, 2013) and the striking down of electoral bonds (2024) came from courts, not the ECI |
| Civil society and media | The Association for Democratic Reforms and independent media made disclosure meaningful |
| State bureaucracy | Lakhs of state officials on deputation actually run the polls |
The limits of the ECI’s contribution
- Weak entrenchment. The Constitution protects the CEC but leaves appointment, EC removal and the budget to statute and the executive. The 2023 appointment law gives the government two of three selectors and remains under challenge.
- Unfinished work. Party spending is uncapped, criminalisation has risen, and the MCC has no statutory force.
- Borrowed authority. Its authority rests on reputation, and bitter disputes over roll revision since 2025 show how quickly that can be questioned.
Conclusion
The ECI is a necessary but not sufficient condition of India’s electoral success. Its constitutional status gave it room to act, and its role turned that room into trust. That trust was co-produced by voters, parties and courts, and it will last only if the Commission’s independence is structurally secured rather than assumed.