‘The role of the Indian Judiciary in recent years has been one of dynamic judicial activism.’ Elucidate. (1991)
In 1976 the Supreme Court told detained citizens in ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla that they could not seek habeas corpus during the Emergency; within four years it was treating a prisoner’s letter as a writ petition. That reversal is what “dynamic” judicial activism means: widening the content of rights, opening the Court to those who could never reach it, and inventing remedies the adversarial model did not know.
Why the Court turned
- A legitimacy deficit. Upendra Baxi, in “Taking Suffering Seriously” (1985), read the new judicial populism as partly “post-emergency catharsis” and an attempt “to seek new, historical bases of legitimation of judicial power”. A Court that had failed liberty rebuilt authority by championing the poor.
- A constitutional invitation. Article 32 makes the remedy itself a fundamental right, and the Directive Principles set duties the political organs neglected.
- Judicial temperament. Justice P. N. Bhagwati and Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer deliberately made the Court a forum for the dispossessed.
The doctrinal engine: Article 21 re-read
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) held that “procedure established by law” must be right, just and fair, binding Articles 14, 19 and 21 together against the compartmentalised reading of A. K. Gopalan (1950). The right to life then filled out:
- Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979) — speedy trial and legal aid for undertrials jailed beyond their possible sentence;
- Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1978) — prisoners keep their rights inside the gate;
- Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) — livelihood is part of life, so pavement dwellers cannot be evicted without a hearing.
The procedural engine: how it was done
| Mechanism | What it changed | Illustration |
|---|---|---|
| Relaxed locus standi | Any bona fide citizen may sue for those too poor or weak to come | S. P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) |
| Epistolary jurisdiction | A letter or news report becomes a petition | Prisoners’ letters; law teachers’ letter on the Agra protective home (1983) |
| Fact-finding commissions | Commissioners gather facts the state conceals | Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984), Faridabad quarries |
| Continuing mandamus | The case stays open; compliance is monitored | Successive Hussainara orders |
| New liability rules | Hazardous enterprises bear absolute liability | M. C. Mehta v. Union of India (1986), oleum gas leak |
Limits already visible
Declarations outran delivery: rehabilitation of freed bonded labourers lagged, and the Court had no administration of its own. Causes reached it by chance, not need; and the 1989 Bhopal settlement it approved was widely criticised as inadequate.
The trajectory since
The dynamism continued but changed character: Baxi’s social action litigation of the rightless shaded into litigation by organised middle-class constituencies — on air, cricket and appointments. Yet the rights core remains alive: K. S. Puttaswamy (2017) repudiated ADM Jabalpur, the 2024 demolition guidelines imposed notice and personal liability on officials, and electoral bonds fell in 2024. In November 2025 a five-judge bench held that Article 142 cannot supplant express constitutional provisions — dynamism learning self-limitation.
Conclusion
The activism of the 1980s was dynamic in the best sense: it enforced entitlements of people with no political voice when the elected organs would not. Its lasting lesson: activism is legitimate when it repairs access and rights, fragile when it substitutes the bench’s preferences for accountable choice.