Comment: The Directive Principles of State Policy are not mere pious declarations but clear directions for the guidance of state policy. (2003, 2007, 20 Marks)
The phrase is B. R. Ambedkar‘s. Defending Part IV in the Constituent Assembly on 19 November 1948, he denied that the principles were meant as mere pious declarations: legislatures and executives were not to pay them lip service but to make them the basis of all executive and legislative action. The claim holds as constitutional design and, unevenly, as practice.
Clear Directions: The Constitutional Case
- Article 37 has three limbs: the principles are unenforceable in any court, yet fundamental in the governance of the country, and the State has a duty to apply them in making laws. The remedy is withdrawn; the obligation is not.
- Ambedkar traced the device to the Instrument of Instructions under the Government of India Act 1935, now addressed to the legislature and executive rather than to Governors, and called it a novel feature of a parliamentary constitution, shared only with the Irish text of 1937.
- The sanction was meant to be political: a government ignoring them would answer to the electorate. Non-justiciability reflected a thin fiscal base in 1950, not a lower rank.
- Courts turned direction into standard. Part IV informs what counts as a reasonable restriction under Article 19, gives content to Article 21, and Minerva Mills (1980) made the balance between Parts III and IV a basic feature.
The Counter-View
- K. T. Shah likened the chapter to a cheque on a bank payable when able; T. T. Krishnamachari to a veritable dustbin of sentiments; K. C. Wheare read it as a manifesto of aims and aspirations; Ivor Jennings as Fabian socialism without the socialism.
- The charge has substance: no court can compel a legislature to act, and nothing ranks the directives, so almost any policy can claim a Part IV pedigree.
How Far Applied in Practice
| Directive | Principal implementation | Record |
|---|---|---|
| 39(b)–(c) | Zamindari abolition, First Amendment and Ninth Schedule, bank nationalisation 1969 | Intermediaries abolished; ceiling redistribution slight |
| 40 | 73rd Amendment 1992 | Panchayats constitutional; funds and staff still withheld |
| 41 | MGNREGA 2005, replaced by the VB–G RAM G Act 2025 (125 days) | Guarantee legislated; delivery far below it |
| 42–43 | Minimum Wages and Maternity Benefit Acts; four labour codes in force November 2025 | Statutory floor wage for all; living wage unmet |
| 45 / 21A | 86th Amendment 2002, RTE Act 2009 | Enrolment near universal; learning lags |
| 47 | NFSA 2013 (about 81 crore beneficiaries); prohibition in Gujarat, Bihar | Food the strongest conversion; prohibition often reversed |
| 48 | State cow-slaughter bans, upheld in Mirzapur Moti Kureshi (2005) | Enforced, socially divisive |
| 48A | Environment (Protection) Act 1986, NGT Act 2010 | Dense law, weak enforcement |
| 50 | CrPC 1973, now BNSS 2023 | Largely achieved |
| 44 | Uttarakhand UCC (in force January 2025); Gujarat, Assam, Madhya Pradesh Bills 2026 | No national code |
- Where legislation lagged, courts carried directives into Article 21: livelihood in Olga Tellis (1985), education in Unni Krishnan (1993), legal aid in Hussainara Khatoon (1979), food through the PUCL orders from 2001.
- The gaps are specific: Article 43A on worker participation is virtually untouched; public health spending stays below the 2.5 per cent of GDP the National Health Policy 2017 targeted; and the top one per cent’s income share of about 22.6 per cent in 2022–23 (World Inequality Lab, 2024) rebukes Articles 38(2) and 39(c).
Conclusion
Part IV has behaved as a set of directions, not homilies: it has been converted into statutes, amendments and Article 21 rights. But Ambedkar’s electoral sanction worked selectively, strong where a directive matched mass demand (food, work, schooling), weak where it did not (a uniform code, worker participation). The directions are clear; compliance remains a political choice.