Highlight any five constitutional provisions that restrain the powers of the executive, and evaluate their effectiveness in current times. (2026, 15 Marks)
The Constitution restrains the executive less by rigid separation than by checks and balances: responsibility to the legislature, judicial review, and independent bodies that Guillermo O’Donnell would call agencies of horizontal accountability. Each works only as well as the institution applying it.
Five provisions and how they work today
| Provision | How it restrains | Effectiveness, 2023–26 |
|---|---|---|
| Art. 75(3): collective responsibility to the Lok Sabha | Ministry survives only with the House’s confidence; questions, motions and committees enforce answerability | Weak to moderate. No-confidence motions (2018, 2023) failed easily; 16% of bills went to committees in the 17th Lok Sabha; the Lok Sabha worked 15% of scheduled time in the Monsoon Session 2026. Coalition since 2024 restores some bite. |
| Arts. 13, 32, 226: judicial review | Executive action and laws are tested against fundamental rights and the basic structure | Strongest check. Electoral bonds struck down (Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024); State of Punjab (2023) curbed gubernatorial delay. Yet the November 2025 opinion refused assent timelines, and the CEC Act challenge remains undecided. |
| Arts. 148–151: CAG | Audit of all Union and state spending; reports laid before the legislature | Eroding. Union audit reports tabled fell from about 40 a year (2014–18) to 18 in 2023. More than 1,500 action-taken notes were pending with ministries (May 2026). Appointment by the executive alone is under challenge. |
| Art. 324: Election Commission | Independent superintendence of elections, beyond executive control | Contested. Anoop Baranwal (2023) was overridden by the CEC Act 2023, which gives the government a 2:1 majority on the selection panel. The Special Intensive Revision was upheld (May 2026) amid opposition distrust. |
| Art. 123 read with Art. 74(1) proviso: limits on ordinances and on advice | Ordinances lapse six weeks after Parliament reassembles; the President may return advice once | Moderate. Krishna Kumar Singh (2017) held re-promulgation a “fraud on the Constitution”, and promulgation has slowed to a handful a year. Still, the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment went from ordinance (May 2026) to money bill. |
Evaluation
- Pattern: checks needing executive cooperation (appointing watchdogs, tabling reports, parliamentary time) have weakened; courts and special majorities still bind. The defeat of the 131st Amendment Bill in the Lok Sabha (17 April 2026, 298–230) shows the Article 368 special majority stopping the Union government.
- Why they weaken: the Tenth Schedule turns the majority into the government’s instrument, so Article 75(3) now works mostly through elections. Executive appointment then weakens the bodies meant to fill that gap, confirming the concern with institutional autonomy in Devesh Kapur, Pratap Bhanu Mehta and Milan Vaishnav (eds.), Rethinking Public Institutions in India (2017).
- Why they persist: courts, an unpredictable electorate (2024) and assertive states keep India short of Lord Hailsham‘s “elective dictatorship”.
Conclusion
The restraints still work, but unevenly: they are strongest where they are external and self-executing, and weakest where they depend on the executive or its majority. The remedies follow: collegial appointment of the CAG and Election Commission, mandatory committee referral, and settling the money-bill question.