Examine the case for formation of small states in India. (1993)

Article 3 lets Parliament form new states by ordinary law, consulting but not obeying the affected legislature. India governs about 1.4 billion people through 28 states and 8 Union Territories; Uttar Pradesh alone outnumbers most countries. The case for smaller states rests on governance, development, identity and federal balance; the case against, on viability and the abuse of Article 3. Tested against the record, it is strong for the largest units and weak as a general rule.

The principled case

  • B. R. Ambedkar, in Thoughts on Linguistic States (1955), accepted one state, one language but rejected one language, one state. He proposed splitting Uttar Pradesh into three, and Bihar and Madhya Pradesh into two each: very large states cannot be administered well, and a consolidated Hindi north would dominate the federation.
  • Administrative efficiency: a smaller unit brings the capital closer to the citizen; Bibek Debroy has argued India needs far more states.
  • Regional development: Robert Hardgrave‘s uneven-development thesis explains why neglected sub-regions — Vidarbha against Mumbai, Bundelkhand against Lucknow and Bhopal — seek their own governments.
  • Identity and voice: Ramachandra Guha and Yogendra Yadav read statehood as the entry of peripheral groups into power, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh’s tribal belts being the clearest cases.

The evidence of 2000 and 2014

The States Reorganisation Commission (1955) had itself recommended a separate Telangana, created only on 2 June 2014. Uttarakhand has outperformed Uttar Pradesh on most human development indicators; Chhattisgarh‘s public distribution reform became a national reference; Telangana stands among the richest large states per head. Jharkhand, by contrast, paired mineral wealth with chronic ministerial instability. Louise Tillin, in Remapping India, shows that timing followed the electoral interest of the party ruling at the Centre, not a principle.

The case against

  • Sceptics find no link between size and governance — Tamil Nadu is large and well run; Jharkhand small and not.
  • Fiscal viability: capitals, secretariats and High Courts are permanent costs, and a state without a revenue base becomes a dependant of Union grants. Residual Andhra Pradesh lost Hyderabad.
  • Instability: small assemblies are cheap to destabilise, as in Goa.
  • Misuse of Article 3: Telangana was carved out after the Andhra assembly rejected the Bill, and in 2019 Jammu and Kashmir was downgraded into two Union Territories without its elected legislature’s consent. In Re: Article 370 (2023) directed statehood restored “at the earliest”; it has not been.
  • Better alternatives: the 73rd and 74th Amendments bring government closer to citizens without new capitals, and “smaller is better” has no stopping point.

Pending demands

The Uttar Pradesh Assembly resolved in November 2011 to divide the state into four; the Centre let it lapse. Harit Pradesh, Vidarbha and Bundelkhand remain live, and a Union committee on a “permanent political solution” for Gorkhaland was formed in August 2026.

Conclusion

The case is compelling where size defeats administration, the demand is durable across parties and the new unit can pay its way — Uttar Pradesh above all. As a slogan it fails. What India lacks is not states but a method: a second States Reorganisation Commission with published criteria, so that statehood rewards evidence rather than agitation or electoral timing.