Famine and Poverty in the Rural interior

Famine and Poverty in the Rural Interior

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Famines Before British Rule

• Ancient and medieval India did not enjoy absolute immunity from famines.
  • The Arthashastra mentions famine relief measures, and famines are recorded during the reigns of Muhammad bin Tughlaq, Akbar, Shah Jahan, and Aurangzeb.
  • What differed under British rule, however, was the far greater frequency of famines, alongside the relative absence of the proactive relief measures earlier rulers had undertaken.

Factors Responsible for the Recurrence of Famines in the 19th Century

Commercialisation of Agriculture

• The commercialisation of agriculture reduced the area under food-crop cultivation, as commercial, non-food crops increasingly replaced food grains.
  • Between 1893–94 and 1945–46, the production of commercial crops rose by 85 per cent, while that of food crops fell by 7 per cent — a shift that devastated the rural economy and often manifested as famine.

Introduction of Revenue Settlements

• The Permanent, Ryotwari, and Mahalwari settlements, together with the excessive land revenue imposed on peasants, led to widespread rural indebtedness and the ruin of Indian artisans through deindustrialisation.
  • This sharply reduced peasants’ purchasing power, pushing many into penury and making food prices unaffordable — a condition that frequently proved fatal during famines.

Introduction of the Permanent Settlement

• The Permanent Settlement gave rise to subinfeudation and absentee landlordism, both of which discouraged investment in agriculture and allied activities.
  • This led to declining production even as population continued to grow, a combination that repeatedly precipitated famine.

Environmental Imperialism

• British intrusion into tribal areas, and the enactment of various Forest Acts, restricted tribal access to forest produce and prohibited jhum cultivation, creating conditions conducive to famine in tribal regions.
• The diversion of food grains to meet army requirements was also an important contributing factor — most notably in the Great Bengal Famine of 1942–43.

Famines under the Company’s Rule

• During the rule of the East India Company, India suffered, in one part or another, twelve famines and four severe scarcities.
  • The first of these was the Bengal Famine of 1769–70, which claimed a third of the province’s population. No significant relief measures were undertaken — instead, Company servants profited handsomely by buying up rice and reselling it at inflated prices.
• The years 1781 and 1782 brought scarcity to Madras; in 1784, a severe famine afflicted the whole of Northern India.
  • During the Madras famine of 1792, the state did open relief works for the famine-stricken.
  • The Famine Commission of 1880 later noted that “till the end of the 18th century the position of the British in India was not such as either to create any sense of general obligation to give relief or to supply sufficient means of affording it.”
• During the 1803 famine in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, the state granted remissions of revenue, extended loans and advances to landowners, and offered a bounty on all grain imported into Benares, Allahabad, Kanpur, and Fatehgarh.
• The Guntur Famine of 1833 exacted a heavy toll — 2 lakh persons died out of a total population of 5 lakh.
• In 1837, a severe famine struck Upper India; public works were opened at several centres, though the relief of the helpless and infirm was largely left to charitable public initiative.
• Under the East India Company, no attempt was made to formulate any general system of famine relief or prevention.
  • Provincial governments and district officers, however, experimented with various measures to relieve famine-stricken areas — including government grain storage, penalties on hoarding, bounties on imports, and loans for sinking wells.

Famine under the Crown Administration (1858–1947)

• The transfer of power from the Company to the Crown, alongside the economic developments of the later 19th century — the extension of railways and other means of communication, and the growth of overseas trade — changed the complexion of the famine problem.
  • The state gradually came to recognise its responsibility for expanding irrigation facilities, enacting agrarian legislation, adopting preventive measures, and formulating a coherent famine relief policy.
  • During Crown rule, the British began systematically appointing committees and commissions on famine.
• Under the Crown, India experienced ten severe famines, besides numerous scarcities.
  • The major 19th-century famines included those of 1860–61 (Delhi–Agra region), the Orissa famine of 1866, the famine of 1876–78, the famine of 1896–97, and the famine of 1899–1900.

The Famine of 1860–61

• The first famine under Crown rule occurred in 1860–61, in the area between Delhi and Agra.
  • This was the first occasion on which poor-houses were used as a means of affording relief, and the first time authorities thought it necessary to investigate the causes, area, and intensity of a famine, and take corresponding measures — Colonel Baird Smith was deputed for this purpose.
  • Colonel Baird Smith’s Committee was the first committee constituted on famine, though its report did not lead to the formulation of any general principles of relief.

The Orissa Famine, 1866

• The drought of 1865, followed by famine the next year, affected Orissa, Madras, Northern Bengal, and Bihar — the calamity was most severe in Orissa, giving the episode its name.
  • Government officers, though forewarned, took no steps to meet the approaching calamity, and appeared helpless once it struck.
  • The Government adhered rigidly to the principles of free trade and the law of demand and supply, providing employment only to the able-bodied, while leaving charitable relief to voluntary agencies — since these agencies achieved very little, the famine took a heavy toll, with an estimated 13 lakh deaths in Orissa alone.
• The George Campbell Committee, appointed under Sir George Campbell to examine the Orissa famine, made recommendations that, in some measure, anticipated those of the later Royal Commission of 1880.
  • The old doctrine that the public was responsible for relieving the helpless was abandoned.
  • The Government was now expected to borrow money to finance the building of railways and canals, and district officers were made responsible for preventing all avoidable deaths.
• In 1868, a severe famine struck Northern and Central India, with Rajputana and Central India the worst affected.
  • The Government did take action to relieve distress, but the relief provided was not commensurate with the scale of suffering, resulting in considerable loss of life.

The Famine of 1876–78

• The great famine of 1876–78 was perhaps the most grievous calamity India had experienced since the start of the 19th century.
  • It affected Madras, Bombay, Uttar Pradesh, and the Punjab, covering an estimated 257,000 square miles and a population of more than 58 million.
  • Many villages were depopulated, and large tracts of territory fell out of cultivation; R.C. Dutt estimated that 5 million persons perished in a single year.
  • The Government’s efforts to help the famine-stricken were half-hearted, its famine machinery inadequate and ineffective, and it refused to recognise any responsibility for saving human lives.

Strachey Commission, 1880

• In 1880, Lord Lytton’s government appointed a Commission under Sir Richard Strachey to formulate general principles and suggest preventive or protective measures.
  • The Commission recommended several basic principles:
    • the formulation of a Famine Code;
    • suspension or remission of land revenue and rent;
    • recognition of the state’s duty to offer relief;
    • regular collection of information on peasant conditions;
    • wages paid on relief works should be periodically adjusted to ensure sufficient food for a labourer’s support;
    • the cost of famine relief should generally be borne by provincial governments, with central assistance available whenever necessary; and
    • food supplies in distressed areas should be carefully watched — though the Government should generally trust private trade for supply and distribution, prohibiting grain exports only when strictly necessary.
  • This Commission laid the groundwork for a formal Famine Policy, including:
    • the creation of a Famine Fund;
    • the incorporation of a new budget head — “Famine Relief and Insurance”; and
    • provision of Rs 1.5 crore annually for this purpose.
• The Government broadly accepted the Commission’s recommendations, taking steps to secure new resources for the Famine Fund to meet extraordinary charges.
  • In 1883, a provisional Famine Code was formulated, serving as the guide and basis for the various Provincial Famine Codes subsequently developed.

Formulation of the Famine Code, 1883

• Implemented in 1886, the Code comprised four major parts:
  • Part I — precautions to be taken during normal times;
  • Part II — instructions to follow once a relief campaign appeared imminent;
  • Part III — the duties of all concerned parties during relief work; and
  • Part IV — the mapping of famine-prone areas, with provincial governments empowered to declare districts either scarcity or famine areas.
• The droughts experienced in various provinces between 1883 and 1896 provided opportunities to test and revise these provincial codes.
  • Between 1880 and 1896, India experienced two famines and five scarcities, all of a broadly local character.

The Famine of 1896–97

• The great famine of 1896–97 affected almost every province, though with varying intensity, striking an estimated 34 million people in total.
  • Relief operations were conducted with a fair measure of success, except in the Central Provinces, where the death rate rose sharply.
  • Extensive relief operations were undertaken, and in many parts of the country, people received relief within their own homes; total relief expenditure was estimated at Rs 7.27 crore.
• The James Lyall Commission (1898), presided over by Sir James Lyall, former Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, largely endorsed the views of the 1880 Commission, suggesting only minor alterations.

The Famine of 1899–1900

• This famine struck almost every province in 1899–1900, affecting an area of 1,89,000 square miles and a population of 28 million.
  • Authorities failed — and in some cases refused — to open relief works in the famine’s early stages; once opened, they were overwhelmed by such vast numbers that the relief system nearly collapsed in many areas.
  • Total relief expenditure reached Rs 10 crore.

Anthony MacDonnell Commission

• Lord Curzon appointed a Commission under Sir Anthony MacDonnell, which summarised accepted principles of relief while suggesting variations where necessary.
  • Important recommendations included:
    • appointment of a Famine Commissioner in provinces where extensive relief operations were expected;
    • opening of Agricultural Banks;
    • early distribution of advances for purchasing seed and cattle, and for sinking temporary wells;
    • improvement of irrigation facilities;
    • creation of better transport facilities;
    • revision of the Famine Code;
    • introduction of a “moral strategy” in relief administration;
    • greater enlistment of non-official assistance; and
    • preference, in appropriate circumstances, for village-level works over the large public works that had until then formed the backbone of relief schemes.
  • Most of the Commission’s recommendations were accepted, and before leaving India, Curzon implemented various measures to prevent and combat famine.
  • The Colin Scott Commission (1901), also appointed under Curzon, focused specifically on improving irrigation facilities.
• Between 1901 and 1941, numerous famines and scarcities of a local character occurred, the most serious being those of 1906–07 and 1907–08.
  • The “moral strategy” recommended by MacDonnell was put into practice during the famine of 1907–08.

The Bengal Famine of 1942–43

• The Great Bengal Famine of 1942–43 exacted a heavy toll of life.
  • Its root causes lay in a series of crop failures Bengal had experienced since 1938, compounded by conditions created by the Second World War.
  • The normal import of rice from Burma ceased, while trade and movement of food grains were severely dislocated by wartime controls and Bengal’s proximity to the Eastern theatre of war.
• This famine has been described as “more man-made than an act of God” — man exploited a situation created by both nature and war.
  • Relief measures were belated and inadequate; the delay in confronting the relief problem, and the failure to formally declare the famine, were bound up with the unfortunate wartime propaganda policy of “no shortage.”
  • Relief expenditure was, at one stage, limited on financial grounds.
  • Above all, the Central Government displayed callous disregard for Bengal’s misfortune, seeking instead to have the Provincial Government of Bengal organise and bear responsibility for famine relief.
• In light of this famine, the John Woodhead Commission (1943–44) was appointed — the last famine commission of the colonial period.
  • Its important recommendations included:
    • creation of an All India Food Council;
    • an increase in the production of food crops; and
    • the amalgamation of the Departments of Food and Agriculture.

An Assessment of British Famine Policy

• It is evident that famines in British India were frequently recurring calamities.
  • Government efforts were consistently half-hearted, the famine administrative machinery inadequate and ineffective, and sanctioned funds quite limited — the general unwisdom of famine policy remains clear, given how slowly it evolved.
  • For a considerable period, moreover, there was no famine policy at all — leaving famine policy’s role in addressing these recurring crises decidedly limited.

How Far Was Commercialisation of Agriculture Responsible for Famine?

• The commercialisation of agriculture led to the substitution of commercial crops for food crops; the shift towards cash crops discouraged cultivation of poor men’s staples such as jowar, bajra, and pulses.
  • This development had a tragic effect on the country’s overall food situation, one said to have resulted in famine — the Orissa and Bengal famines of 1866 bear testimony to this process of crop substitution.
• It remains an open question whether the expansion of commercial agriculture in India came at the direct expense of food crops; what is clear is that commercial crop output registered a greater increase than that of food crops.
  • Establishing a direct causal link between commercialisation and famine is difficult, even though cash crops, in certain areas, may have displaced food grains from better-quality land, with a consequent impact on output.
  • Even where this occurred, it appears to have been an extremely localised phenomenon, since, on the whole, food crops and cash crops were produced simultaneously across most regions.
  • By the end of colonial rule, food crops were still being grown on 80 per cent of cropped acreage. On the whole, however, the aggregate production of food crops lagged behind population growth.
• Given this, the claim by some historians that the growth of trade and the integration of markets — through infrastructure development — actually increased food security and contained the frequency and severity of famines in colonial India remains, at best, a contentious issue — particularly in light of the Bengal Famine of 1943, which was preceded by a long period of steadily declining per capita rice entitlement in the province.