What are the main drivers of India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership? (2022, 20 Marks)
India and Japan opened diplomatic relations in 1952, but strategic content came only when Manmohan Singh and Shinzo Abe named their ties a Strategic and Global Partnership in 2006; Narendra Modi and Abe raised it to a Special Strategic and Global Partnership in September 2014. Its drivers work in layers: China’s rise, maritime geography, economic complementarity and an ideational fit between two democracies with no historical quarrel.
1. The strategic driver: a shared China problem
- Stephen M. Walt’s balance of threat (The Origins of Alliances, 1987) explains the convergence better than raw power: both face the same assertive neighbour, India on the Himalayan boundary (Galwan, 2020) and Japan around the Senkaku Islands. Kautilya’s mandala reads the same geometry: the neighbour’s neighbour is a natural friend.
- Institutions followed: the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (2008, revised at the 15th summit in August 2025), the 2015 agreements on classified military information and defence equipment transfer, the ministerial 2+2 (2019) and the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (2020).
- Operational habit comes from JAIMEX, Dharma Guardian, Shinyuu Maitri and Japan’s permanent place in Malabar since 2015; the UNICORN naval antenna is the first defence co-development project.
2. The maritime-geographic driver
- Abe’s “Confluence of the Two Seas” address to India’s Parliament (August 2007) joined the Pacific and Indian Oceans into one strategic space; India sits astride the sea lanes between Hormuz and Malacca that carry Japan’s Gulf energy.
- Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific now dovetails with India’s Act East policy and MAHASAGAR vision, and both work through the Quad.
3. Economic complementarity and economic security
- Japan brings capital, technology and an ageing society; India brings scale, demand and young labour. Japan is India’s largest bilateral development partner, financing the Delhi Metro and the Mumbai–Ahmedabad High-Speed Rail.
- The 15th summit (Tokyo, 29 August 2025) adopted a Joint Vision for the Next Decade with eight pillars, set a ¥10 trillion private investment target, launched an Economic Security Initiative and planned 500,000 personnel exchanges in five years.
- At the 16th summit (New Delhi, July 2026), Sanae Takaichi’s first visit, the two adopted a Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation covering semiconductors, critical minerals, ICT, clean energy and pharmaceuticals. Japanese firms announced some $12.5 billion of investment. The trigger is shared vulnerability: Chinese rare-earth curbs hit Japan in 2010 and India in 2025.
4. Normative and diplomatic drivers
- Shared values without baggage: democracy and no war, territorial dispute or colonial memory. Buddhist links, Justice Radhabinod Pal’s Tokyo Tribunal dissent and India’s 1952 waiver of reparations left lasting goodwill.
- A common reform agenda: both belong to the G4 and back each other for permanent Security Council seats. Japan’s 2016 civil nuclear agreement is its only one with a non-NPT state.
- Mutual hedging: Japan wants an Indian Ocean partner that is no US client; India wants capital neither Chinese nor conditional, which fits S. Jaishankar’s preference for “convergences and issue-based arrangements” (2019) over alliances.
Limits that temper the drivers
| Driver | Brake |
|---|---|
| China threat | Different intensity; India’s own 2025–26 thaw with Beijing |
| Complementarity | Trade only $27.47 billion in 2025-26, Indian deficit about $15 billion; CEPA (2011) under review |
| Defence ties | No alliance; the US-2 aircraft deal never closed |
Rohan Mukherjee reads it as a pragmatic bargain in which each supplies what the other lacks; Rajesh Basrur holds that flexible partnership suits both better than alliance.
Conclusion
Structure (China, the sea lanes, economic fit) drives the partnership; shared values and the absence of grievance sustain it. Strategic convergence is near complete; the economic driver lags. The way forward is a modernised CEPA, real progress towards the ¥10 trillion target, and joint refining and chip supply chains that turn declarations into capacity before the 75th anniversary of relations in 2027.