Discuss the potential role that India could play as the leader of the Global South in realising the goal of establishing a new international economic order in the 21st century. (2024, 15 Marks)
The New International Economic Order (NIEO), proclaimed at the UN General Assembly’s Sixth Special Session in 1974, sought to complete decolonisation in the economic sphere, giving substance to Jawaharlal Nehru’s conviction that political freedom without economic independence is incomplete. It stalled within a decade. India, once among its drafters, now has the size and the seats to revive parts of it; the question is which parts.
The agenda India would inherit
- Sovereign equality and permanent sovereignty over natural resources; fairer terms of trade, the grievance theorised by Raúl Prebisch and Hans Singer.
- Transfer of finance and technology for industrialisation, and democratised voting in the IMF, the World Bank and trade rule-making.
- Collective self-reliance to strengthen the South’s bargaining hand.
India’s assets as a convenor
- Lineage: a founder of the G-77 (1964), host of UNCTAD II (New Delhi, 1968) and a mover of GATT Part IV and the 1979 Enabling Clause, which wrote non-reciprocity into trade law.
- A bridging position in the G20, BRICS and the Quad. At the first Voice of the Global South Summit (January 2023) Narendra Modi told 125 countries “your Voice is India’s Voice” and proposed an agenda to “Respond, Recognize, Respect and Reform”. The G20 presidency then won the African Union’s permanent seat (9 September 2023).
- Market leverage the old coalition never had: India defends food-security stockholding and special and differential treatment; at Yaoundé (March 2026) it joined South Africa in keeping the investment-facilitation plurilateral out of the rulebook.
- Public goods, not debt: digital public infrastructure, Vaccine Maitri, ITEC, the International Solar Alliance and the 2024 Global Development Compact, all conditionality-free.
- Agenda-setting as BRICS chair: the New Delhi Declaration (September 2026) demanded IMF, World Bank and WTO reform and criticised unilateral tariffs.
What India can realistically deliver
| NIEO goal | Feasible Indian contribution |
|---|---|
| Voice in finance | IMF quota realignment (India holds about 2.75%), development-bank reform, debt restructuring |
| Technology | TRIPS flexibilities (the 2020 waiver proposal with South Africa); open digital infrastructure |
| Development finance | Southern lending as Western aid shrinks: DAC aid fell 23.1% in 2025 (OECD) |
| Climate justice | Common but differentiated responsibilities; the $1.3tn a year that Baku’s $300bn goal only gestures at |
The limits
- Capacity: India cannot match Chinese finance, and its credit lines disburse slowly.
- Mandate: no one elected India. China, Brazil and Indonesia contest the role, and the run of four Southern G20 presidencies (2022–25) gave way to a US presidency that refused South Africa an invitation for 2026.
- Divergent interests: defensive farm positions, Western partnerships and refusal of BRICS de-dollarisation divide India from parts of the South.
- C. Raja Mohan (2023) warns that the “Global South” label hides sharply divergent interests and urges practical cooperation rather than a bloc against the North.
Conclusion
India’s ask has moved from redistribution to representation. It can lead an order of reformed institutions, shared technology and protected policy space, but not a 1974-style transfer it cannot finance. As a convenor and bridge rather than a bloc leader, its claim will rest on delivery, not rhetoric.