Does the actual working of Indian federalism conform to the centralizing tendencies in Indian polity? Give reasons for your answer. (2023, 20 Marks)
Ivor Jennings called India a federation with a strong centralising tendency. Practice has followed that tendency in some periods and through some instruments, but not in a straight line. Practice has swung with the party system, and since 1994 it has rested on a judicial floor.
Reasons it conforms
- Party-system phases. M. P. Singh distinguishes a parliamentary axis from a federal axis. The parliamentary axis dominates whenever one party holds a majority at the Centre:
- 1950–67: Rajni Kothari‘s Congress system settled federal disputes inside one party. The Planning Commission, set up by Cabinet resolution, controlled development spending.
- 1967–89: confrontation followed. Art. 356 saw its heaviest use, and the 42nd Amendment moved subjects to the Concurrent List.
- 2014–24: Suhas Palshikar describes a “BJP system”, with one dominant party again setting national terms.
- Fiscal centralisation.
- Cesses and surcharges cut the divisible pool from 89.1% of gross tax revenue (2014–15) to about 81% (2025–26). The states’ effective share is therefore about 32–33%, well below the headline 41%.
- NITI Aayog (2015) was presented as bottom-up and “competitive-cooperative”. But discretion over transfers moved to Union ministries. Balveer Arora called it an imperfect clone of the institution it replaced, and M. P. Singh warned of a “spoils system”.
- GST absorbed most state tax powers, and the states’ request to extend compensation was refused.
- The net borrowing ceiling under Art. 293 now counts borrowing by state enterprises against the state.
- Central agencies. The ED needs no state consent, and Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (2022) upheld its powers. Eleven states have withdrawn general consent to the CBI.
- The Governor. Maharashtra (2022) and delayed assent show a politicised office. The Presidential Reference opinion of 20 November 2025 left assent almost entirely outside judicial review.
- Art. 3. Jammu and Kashmir was reorganised into Union Territories in 2019.
Reasons it does not simply conform
- The coalition era (1989–2014). Regional parties held the balance at the Centre, and Arora saw a drift towards the “quasi-confederal”. Art. 356 became politically costly. Since 2024 dependence on the TDP and JD(U) has brought back bargaining, as the special packages for Andhra Pradesh and Bihar show.
- The courts. S. R. Bommai (1994) made federalism a basic feature. Partisan mass dismissals did not return even under a single-party majority; Manipur (2025–26) followed a breakdown of order. Mineral Area Development Authority and Lalta Prasad Vaish (both 2024) upheld state powers. Mohit Minerals (2022) made GST Council advice persuasive, not binding. Art. 131 suits by Kerala, West Bengal and Tamil Nadu force the Union to defend its conduct in court.
- States assert themselves. The farm laws were repealed in 2021. The draft IAS cadre amendment was not notified in the form proposed. The southern bloc defeated the 131st Amendment Bill (April 2026). The GST Council works mostly by consensus; it first voted only in December 2019.
- Regional parties. In 2026 the TVK ended Tamil Nadu’s Dravidian duopoly and the UDF won Kerala, even as the BJP took West Bengal. The states remain distinct arenas of choice.
Assessment
Centralising pressure has moved rather than grown. Article 356 is now policed by the courts, so pressure works through instruments that are not: cesses, conditional scheme funds, the Governor’s discretion and agency jurisdiction.
Conclusion
The answer is yes in design and in the fiscal instruments, and no as a settled trend. Practice follows the centralising tendency when one party dominates and falls away when politics fragments. The Bommai floor has held throughout. Protecting the states’ sphere now depends on turning conventions, such as the timing of assent and limits on cesses, into justiciable rules.