Discuss whether coalitional politics has led to a different pattern of federalism in India. (2006)
W. H. Morris-Jones called Indian federalism “bargaining federalism”, but in the Congress era the bargaining took place inside one party. From 1989 to 2014 no party won a Lok Sabha majority, and the bargaining moved into the Union Cabinet itself. The result was a genuinely different pattern of federalism, though it was produced by the party system rather than by any constitutional change.
How the pattern changed, 1989–2014
- Regional parties in the Union executive. The TDP, DMK, Trinamool, JD(U) and Akali Dal held ministries and could veto policy that hurt their states. Federal questions became daily negotiation rather than constitutional interpretation.
- Article 356 fell into disuse. Dismissing a state government could mean dismissing a partner. After S. R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) made proclamations justiciable and the floor test decisive, the courts supplied the legal restraint and coalition arithmetic the political one.
- Institutions revived. The Inter-State Council was constituted in 1990 under a minority government, and the Rajya Sabha gained weight because coalitions rarely controlled it.
- States in foreign policy. Tamil Nadu shaped India’s votes on Sri Lanka at the UN Human Rights Council (2012–13), and West Bengal stalled the Teesta agreement.
Balveer Arora described a drift from quasi-federal toward quasi-confederal. Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar showed that the state had become the effective arena of electoral choice, a federalisation of the party system. Lawrence Saez, in Federalism Without a Centre (2002), argued that coalitions and liberalisation together moved India from intergovernmental cooperation to interjurisdictional competition among states.
Limits of the claim
- Particularist, not principled. Partners bargained bilaterally for packages, portfolios and projects. No amendment strengthened the states, the Punchhi Commission’s report (2010) went largely unimplemented, and the ISC never became a decision-making forum.
- Other causes. Liberalisation after 1991, Bommai and the Finance Commissions did as much as coalitions to decentralise. The 14th Finance Commission’s jump to 42% devolution came under a majority government.
- Reversibility. The single-party majorities of 2014 and 2019 brought back centralising instruments:
- the 2019 reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir;
- the Delhi NCT amendments of 2021 and 2023;
- Union-branded centrally sponsored schemes;
- the Art. 356 proclamations in Arunachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand (2016), both undone by the courts.
Palshikar calls this a “BJP system”, which recalls Rajni Kothari‘s Congress system.
2024: the pattern returns
With 240 seats, the BJP depends on the TDP (16) and JD(U) (12). The July 2024 budget carried ₹15,000 crore for Andhra Pradesh’s capital and large highway and power projects for Bihar. Special-category status was refused, but packages were granted. These are pre-2014 bargaining habits resurfacing. The allies accepted light portfolios while extracting state-directed benefits. The defeat of the 131st Amendment Bill on delimitation (April 2026) confirms that Lok Sabha arithmetic once again limits the Centre.
Conclusion
Coalition politics did produce a different pattern: negotiated, state-centred and less coercive. It was a pattern of practice, not structure. It rose and fell with Lok Sabha arithmetic and favoured pivotal states over all states. India’s federal balance tracks its party system more closely than its Constitution. Durable federalism therefore needs institutions such as a functioning ISC and rule-based transfers, which do not depend on who holds the balance in Delhi.