Make an assessment of the composition, functioning and the role of the Election Commission of India in the conduct of free and fair elections. (2005)
The Election Commission of India (ECI), constituted on 25 January 1950 under Article 324, is a permanent constitutional body vested with superintendence, direction and control of elections to Parliament, state legislatures and the offices of President and Vice-President. Its electoral record is exceptional; its composition is the weak link, and that weakness now colours how its functioning is judged.
Composition: an open-textured design
| Element | Position | Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| Size | Art. 324(2): CEC plus such ECs as the President fixes | Single-member 1950–89; two ECs added Oct 1989, abolished Jan 1990; three-member since Oct 1993 |
| Appointment | By President, “subject to” a law of Parliament | Executive choice for 73 years; law came only in 2023 |
| Tenure | Six years or age 65 | Fixed by statute, not the Constitution |
| Removal | CEC only like a Supreme Court judge (Art. 324(5)); ECs on the CEC’s recommendation | Removal asymmetry weakens collegiality |
- Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023) held executive-only appointment structurally unsafe and ordered an interim panel of the PM, Leader of Opposition (LoP) and CJI.
- The 2023 Act replaced the CJI with a Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM, with a Law Minister-led search committee and Secretary-rank eligibility. Two of three selectors now belong to the government; its validity awaits the CJI’s decision on a larger bench after the 23 September 2026 split verdict.
- It has no cadre of its own: Returning Officers and police are state employees on deputation for the poll.
Functioning: collegial in law, contested in practice
- T. N. Seshan v. Union of India (1995) made the CEC a first among equals and required majority decision where consensus fails.
- T. N. Seshan (1990–96) turned the Model Code of Conduct (MCC), a non-statutory text, into an enforced regime through observers, transfers and countermanding polls.
- Collegiality has frayed repeatedly: N. Gopalaswami’s 2009 recommendation to remove Navin Chawla was rejected by the government; Ashok Lavasa’s 2019 dissents on MCC complaints went unrecorded; in 2026 the two ECs reportedly objected to some of the CEC’s roll decisions.
- Technology and rolls: EVMs nationwide since 2004, VVPAT universal since 2019, and the Special Intensive Revision (Bihar, 2025), upheld by the Supreme Court in May 2026 as within Art. 324.
Role in free and fair elections: an assessment
Strengths.
- Mohinder Singh Gill (1978) read Art. 324 as a reservoir of power for situations the statute does not cover.
- The 2024 Lok Sabha poll reached nearly 98 crore electors with repolls at barely forty polling stations.
- Losers accept results, which Adam Przeworski treats as the test of democracy; Ujjwal Kumar Singh and Anupama Roy call this the ECI “institutionalising democratic uncertainties”, keeping outcomes open by holding rules fixed.
Limits.
- Enforcement gaps. The MCC has no legal sanction, the ECI cannot deregister parties, and unlimited party spending escapes the candidate ceiling.
- Accountability. Discretion over rolls and complaints is rarely explained, so the independence-accountability balance tilts toward opacity.
- Perceived neutrality. Removal notices against CEC Gyanesh Kumar were rejected in April 2026, but they signal thinning opposition trust.
Conclusion
On competence and role, the ECI ranks among India’s most successful institutions. Its composition has always depended on executive forbearance, and its authority rests on a reputation for neutrality that no statute confers. Broad-based appointment, equal removal protection for all Commissioners and an independent secretariat would put that authority on firmer ground than goodwill.