Discuss how far the grass root democratic institutions have remained successful in accelerating the process of rural development after 73rd constitutional amendment. (2007)
The Balwantrai Mehta Committee (1957) had argued that rural development cannot succeed without popular participation, and Article 243G asks panchayats to plan for “economic development and social justice”. Three decades on, the record is partial success. Panchayats have accelerated the delivery of basic services and entitlements. They have done far less to shape the direction of rural development, which is still designed above them.
Where they accelerated development
- Service delivery — roads, drains, streetlights, drinking water and school buildings now run through gram panchayats. Under the Swachh Bharat Mission (Gramin) and the Jal Jeevan Mission, gram sabha resolutions and village water committees became the means of implementation.
- Employment guarantee — MGNREGA (2005) required at least half of works by cost to be executed by gram panchayats, and made social audit by the gram sabha (Section 17) a statutory duty. This was the most direct link between local democracy and rural livelihoods.
- Planning where states devolved — Kerala’s People’s Plan Campaign (1996) devolved roughly 35–40% of plan outlay as untied funds against ward-level plans, with measurable gains in housing, sanitation and local infrastructure. Gram Panchayat Development Plans, prepared annually since 2015–16 and through the “Sabki Yojana Sabka Vikas” campaign since 2018, have spread the method nationally.
- Changed priorities — Raghabendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo (2004) found that panchayats headed by women invested more in drinking water. Who governs changes what gets built.
Where they fell short
- Scheme agents, not governments — the Eleventh Schedule is permissive, and the national devolution index stands at about 43.9% (2024). Centrally sponsored missions arrive with their own committees and accounts, so panchayats certify work rather than plan it.
- Money without discretion — own-tax revenue is about 1%; transfers are largely tied. Parallel bodies — DRDAs, scheme societies, MPLADS — occupy the development space.
- Elite capture — Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee show that decentralisation’s gains depend on local inequality: where land and literacy are concentrated, benefits are captured. The Mani Shankar Aiyar Committee (2013) found “decentralisation of corruption” and concluded that bad panchayati raj is worse than none.
- Capacity — secretaries answerable upward, untrained members, and District Planning Committees that rarely produce plans.
The recent picture
- The Panchayat Advancement Index (PAI 2.0, 2023–24) assessed about 2.6 lakh gram panchayats against localised SDG themes. None reached “Achiever”, and only 3,635 were Front Runners.
- The Viksit Bharat–Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) Act, 2025 repealed MGNREGA. It raises the guarantee to 125 days and mandates Viksit Gram Panchayat Plans, which formally strengthens panchayat planning, and it keeps social audit. But it replaces a demand-driven right with a normatively allocated programme on 60:40 cost-sharing. The gram sabha then audits an allocation rather than an enforceable entitlement, which weakens its leverage.
Conclusion
Panchayats have been moderately successful as delivery channels and largely unsuccessful as engines of development planning. Success tracks devolution, as Kerala and pre-1992 Karnataka and West Bengal show, rather than the Amendment itself. Development will accelerate further only when funds, functions and functionaries follow the Eleventh Schedule and the gram sabha holds a real entitlement to audit.