Has the thrust of government tilted towards executive in contemporary Indian Politics? Give your arguments. (2020, 15 Marks)
Walter Bagehot called the fusion of executive and legislature the “efficient secret” of parliamentary government. It is meant to keep the executive answerable daily; under a disciplined majority it drifts towards Lord Hailsham‘s “elective dictatorship“. Contemporary India shows a clear tilt towards the executive, though since 2024 it has been partly checked.
Arguments that the tilt is real
1. Law-making around Parliament
- Ordinances (Article 123) have become a legislative shortcut. The farm laws began as 2020 ordinances; the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment was promulgated on 16 May 2026 and then routed as a money bill. D. C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar (1987) and Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017) called re-promulgation a “fraud on the Constitution”.
- The money bill route (Article 110) sidesteps the Rajya Sabha. The Aadhaar Act was upheld in K. S. Puttaswamy (2018) over Justice D. Y. Chandrachud‘s dissent, and Rojer Mathew (2019) referred the point to a larger bench, which has yet to rule.
- Delegated legislation, now most of the law citizens meet, is barely scrutinised.
2. Scrutiny hollowed out
- In the 17th Lok Sabha only 16% of bills went to committees, a lower share than in any of the three previous Houses. 35% of bills passed with under an hour of debate, and the House met on just 274 days.
- In the Monsoon Session 2026 the Lok Sabha worked 15% of its scheduled time; nine of the eleven bills passed with only the minister speaking.
- About 80% of the budget was voted without discussion (the guillotine, 2019–23). The Deputy Speaker’s post has been vacant since 2019.
3. Decisions and watchdogs
- Demonetisation (2016), the reading down of Article 370 and the 2020 lockdown were settled in a small circle before Parliament.
- The CEC Act 2023 replaced the Chief Justice on the selection panel with a Union minister, reversing Anoop Baranwal (2023). Consent-free ED jurisdiction and Governors’ delays on bills carry executive power into the states.
- The Tenth Schedule and party centralisation make MPs party delegates, the executive face of the presidentialisation described by Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb.
Counter-arguments
- Courts: Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (2024) struck down electoral bonds, and State of Punjab (2023) held that a Governor cannot sit on bills indefinitely.
- Coalition since 2024: the lateral-entry advertisement was withdrawn, the Broadcasting Bill shelved and the Waqf Bill sent to a Joint Committee. The 131st Amendment Bill failed to win two-thirds on 17 April 2026.
- States: opposition-ruled states have withdrawn consent for the CBI and filed suits under Article 131.
- Not new: Indira Gandhi‘s 42nd Amendment went much further.
Conclusion
Yes, the thrust has tilted towards the executive. The cause is less the constitutional text than large majorities, anti-defection discipline and a Parliament that sits and scrutinises less. The 2024 verdict and judicial review show it is reversible; balance depends more on a legislature that sits, refers bills to committees and debates the budget than on weakening the executive.