Analyse the significance of Article 32 of the Indian Constitution. (2013, 15 Marks)
B. R. Ambedkar told the Constituent Assembly (9 December 1948) that without Article 32 the Constitution “would be a nullity”; it was “the very soul of the Constitution and the very heart of it”. Its significance lies less in the writs, inherited from English law, than in four linked components — and in how they strain against one another.
1. The normative core: a remedy that is itself a right
- Placed inside Part III, Article 32 turns the rights of Articles 14–30 from declarations into enforceable claims — the contrast with the non-justiciable Directive Principles (Article 37) is deliberate.
- A citizen may go straight to the Supreme Court. Romesh Thappar (1950) called the Court the “protector and guarantor” of fundamental rights, bound to hear such petitions; Article 226, by contrast, is a discretionary power.
2. The institutional component: review and entrenchment
- Read with Article 13, it is the channel of judicial review of unconstitutional laws and arbitrary executive action — the Court as guardian of the Constitution.
- L. Chandra Kumar (1997) placed review under Articles 32 and 226 in the basic structure, so Parliament cannot oust it, even through tribunals.
3. The creative component: from writs to remedies
- Article 32(2) empowers “directions, orders or writs”, freeing the Court from English technicalities.
- Public interest litigation: Hussainara Khatoon (1979) exposed undertrials jailed beyond their maximum sentence; S. P. Gupta (1981) relaxed standing for anyone acting bona fide for those unable to sue; letters became petitions (epistolary jurisdiction). Upendra Baxi named this social action litigation.
- Compensation: Rudul Sah (1983) awarded money for fourteen years of illegal detention; Nilabati Behera (1993) held sovereign immunity no defence in public law.
- Guidelines where statute was silent — Vishaka (1997) on workplace sexual harassment.
4. The limiting component: suspension and self-restraint
- Article 359 allows suspension in Emergency. In ADM Jabalpur (1976, 4:1) the Court denied detenus habeas corpus; H. R. Khanna dissented alone. The 44th Amendment (1978) made Articles 20 and 21 non-suspendable, and K. S. Puttaswamy (2017) expressly overruled the majority.
- Self-restraint: since Kanubhai Brahmbhatt (1987) benches have sent petitioners to High Courts; in November 2020 Chief Justice S. A. Bobde openly spoke of discouraging Article 32 petitions. Pendency above 93,000 (March 2026) drives the trend.
How the components interact
- Expansion feeds restriction: PIL and guideline-making swelled the docket, and the docket now justifies relegation, which dilutes the core guarantee. Anuj Bhuwania (Courting the People, 2017) argues PIL also dissolved procedural discipline; Pratap Bhanu Mehta warned of a drift towards “judicial sovereignty”.
- Entrenchment guards against Parliament but not against the Court’s own nerve: ADM Jabalpur shows the remedy is only as strong as the bench.
Conclusion
Article 32 made rights enforceable and the Supreme Court a central political institution, keeping the Constitution a living document. Today the danger to it comes less from Parliament than from within — docket pressure and discretionary relegation — so its significance depends on the Court treating it as the right the text says it is.
