Comment: “Laws are any necessary relations arising from the nature of a thing.” (Montesquieu) (1997)
The line opens The Spirit of the Laws (1748) of Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu; in Thomas Nugent’s translation, laws, in their most general signification, are the necessary relations arising from the nature of things. Law is treated not as a sovereign’s command or a timeless code but as a relation to be discovered, as a scientist finds the laws of motion. The move made him a founder of comparative political science and of constitutional government.
Law as Relation
- All beings have their laws: God, the material world, animals and man. Physical beings obey theirs invariably; man, a free and fallible intelligent being, constantly breaks his.
- Positive laws are therefore not arbitrary. Law in general is human reason, and each nation’s laws are particular applications of it.
- They should fit the physical and moral situation of a people: climate, soil, extent, livelihood, religion, wealth, commerce, manners and customs. Together these relations make up the “spirit” of the laws, and laws framed for one nation will rarely suit another.
From Relations to Forms of Government
| Government | Nature | Principle that moves it |
|---|---|---|
| Republic (democratic or aristocratic) | the people, or part of it, rules | virtue (moderation in aristocracy) |
| Monarchy | one rules by fixed laws | honour |
| Despotism | one rules by caprice | fear |
Laws must agree with the nature and principle of the government; a republic that loses virtue decays. In Book XI, political liberty is a right of doing whatever the laws permit and survives only where power checks power. Hence the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers, drawn from his reading of England, which shaped the American Constitution of 1787.
Significance for Constitutional Democracy
The formula grounds three democratic lessons. Constitutions must fit the society they govern; liberty needs institutional design, not good rulers; and law is subject to reason, not will. Émile Durkheim (1892) accordingly hailed him as a precursor of sociology.
The Critique
- Ambiguity. John Austin (The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, 1832) called scientific “laws” law only by metaphor; law proper is a command. Montesquieu runs description (what is) together with prescription (what ought to be).
- Determinism. Climatic explanation risks fatalism, and he was drawn on for claims about Asian despotism. David Hume (“Of National Characters”, 1748) argued that moral causes such as government and education, not physical ones, shape a people. Montesquieu’s own reply was that good legislators must counteract the vices of climate.
- Relativism. If laws are relative to a people, universal rights become hard to defend.
- Misreading England. Walter Bagehot (The English Constitution, 1867) showed that the Cabinet fused executive and legislature.
Indian Illustration
India applies both halves of the formula. Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab (1955) held that the Constitution recognises separation of functions but not the doctrine in its absolute rigidity. Article 371A protects Naga customary law and land ownership from parliamentary legislation unless the state Assembly agrees, and Uttarakhand’s Uniform Civil Code (2024) exempted Scheduled Tribes: law fitted to the “spirit” of a people.
Conclusion
Montesquieu’s definition is philosophically loose but politically fertile. It teaches that good law is relational and plural and that liberty needs divided power. Its limit is relativism: a constitution must fit its people without surrendering rights common to all.