To what extent does the Rawlsian goal of achieving social justice depend on an overarching consensus among cultural, religious and ideological groups? (2000)
The consensus meant is what John Rawls calls an overlapping consensus: reasonable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines each endorsing one political conception of justice from within their own premises. Rawlsian social justice depends on it heavily for stability and legitimacy, but not for the content or justification of its principles.
Why the consensus became necessary
- A Theory of Justice (1971) needed no such consensus. The original position justified the principles; stability came from citizens’ acquired sense of justice and the congruence of the right with their good.
- Rawls later judged this unrealistic. Free institutions generate the fact of reasonable pluralism: the burdens of judgement lead reasonable people to incompatible comprehensive doctrines.
- Political Liberalism (1993) therefore recast justice as fairness as a freestanding political conception, drawn from ideas implicit in democratic culture and supported by overlapping consensus, reached through an earlier constitutional consensus on procedures.
Where the dependence is real
- Stability for the right reasons. Each group affirms the conception on its own moral grounds, unlike a modus vivendi, a truce that collapses when the balance of power shifts.
- Legitimacy. Coercion is legitimate only under constitutional essentials all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse, defended in terms of public reason.
Where it does not
- Justification. The principles are worked out first. The consensus is not a bargain splitting the difference between creeds, and unreasonable doctrines need not be accommodated.
- Depth. Basic liberties and a social minimum are constitutional essentials; the difference principle is not. The most egalitarian part of social justice rests least on consensus.
- Plurality of conceptions. In “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” (1997) Rawls allowed that public reason is set by a family of liberal political conceptions. A consensus may therefore form around a less egalitarian member of that family.
- Achievability. Rawls concedes that a consensus may not form in every society, or last once formed.
Critics
- Jürgen Habermas (1995): Rawls blurs acceptance with acceptability; agreement shows that citizens concur, not that the principles are valid.
- Joseph Raz, “Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence” (1990): a theory of justice cannot coherently refuse to claim truth.
- Michael Sandel: on slavery or abortion, bracketing comprehensive convictions is itself a contested moral stance.
- Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism (2000): “reasonable” is defined in liberal terms, so the consensus admits only doctrines already liberalised; deeply diverse societies need intercultural dialogue around their operative public values.
The Indian anchor
The Constitution is itself an overlapping consensus: Gandhian religious pluralism, Nehruvian secular modernism and B. R. Ambedkar’s egalitarianism converged on common rights and minority protections for different reasons. Rajeev Bhargava‘s principled distance names this political, not comprehensive, settlement. Its limits show in the Uniform Civil Code debate: Uttarakhand’s code came into force in January 2025, exempting Scheduled Tribes, and Gujarat and Assam passed UCC Bills in 2026. Whether uniformity is endorsed from within each tradition or imposed by a majority decides whether it is consensus or modus vivendi.
Conclusion
Rawlsian social justice depends on overlapping consensus to a considerable but bounded extent. Without it the principles can be neither stable nor legitimately enforced in a plural society; yet their content is fixed independently, and their redistributive core is exactly what consensus is least able to secure.