State under Akbar: Establishment of Jagir & Mansab Systems

State Under Akbar: Establishment of Jagir and Mansab Systems

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• From the fourteenth century, the disintegration of the Mongol empire gave rise to new, liberal currents of thought in West and Central Asia — currents that found expression in the state founded by Timur.
  • Although Timur’s successors were keen to present themselves as orthodox Islamic rulers, they were unwilling to abandon the yassa of Chingiz, which, among other things, enjoined the ruler to treat “all sects as one and not to distinguish them from one another.”
  • The Timurid belief in their divine right to rule was widely respected, so much so that none of the begs aspired to the throne themselves — lending a certain stability once a ruler had proved his capacity to govern.
  • It was this very tradition that Babur carried with him when he laid the foundations of the Mughal state in India, and Humayun followed in his footsteps.
• Fifteenth-century India, too, saw the wide diffusion of liberal Sufi orders, which placed love of and devotion to God above formal ritual and made no distinction between devotees of different faiths.
  • Bhakti saints such as Kabir, Raidas, and Nanak emphasised the unity of all devotees, regardless of caste or religion.
  • In many of the provincial kingdoms that arose during this period, Hindus were admitted to high state office, broad religious toleration was generally practised, and patronage was extended to local languages and literature.
• Thus, by the time Akbar took the reins of government after the end of Bairam Khan’s regency, he had a rich, liberal tradition to draw upon in shaping the Mughal state.

Akbar’s Concept of Suzerainty

• Akbar’s religious ideas and his concept of suzerainty are laid out in detail by his biographer, Abul Fazl.
  • According to Abul Fazl, “Royalty is a light emanating from God, and a ray from the sun” — a divine light termed farr-i-izadi, communicated by God to kings without any human intermediary, before which all men were bound to submit.
  • Royalty was thus a divine gift: the ruler owed nothing to the ulama for his legitimacy, and all were obliged to submit to whoever possessed this light.
  • This idea was not new — it drew on the pre-Islamic Sassanian concept of royalty in Iran, a concept already familiar to Balban when he attempted to adopt Iranian forms of kingship. Abul Fazl, however, fused this older concept with elements drawn from both Muslim and Hindu thought.
    • A ruler endowed with farr-i-izadi was expected to show paternal love towards his subjects; possess a large heart, implying discrimination, courage, and firmness, along with attentiveness to the wishes of great and small alike; and maintain a daily increasing trust in God through prayer and devotion, so that adversity would not unsettle him, tyranny would be punished, and moderation and reason would guide his conduct.

Abul Fazl’s Classification of Society

• Abul Fazl’s concept of state and sovereignty must be read alongside his understanding of society and his religio-spiritual worldview.
• Drawing on ancient Hindu tradition as well as Muslim thinkers such as Jalaluddin Dawwani, Abul Fazl divided human beings into four categories: warriors; artificers and merchants; the learned; and husbandmen and labourers.
  • By placing the learned — that is, the religious classes such as brahmans and ulama — in the third category rather than the first (as in the Dharmashastras), Abul Fazl sought to downgrade these highly self-assured and pretentious sections of society.
• Abul Fazl also drew on prevailing social reality, citing the ancient Greek tradition of classifying human beings into three types on the basis of their qualities: the noble, the base, and the intermediate.
  • The noble included those possessing pure intellect, sagacity, administrative or literary capability, and personal courage for military duty.
  • The base or ignoble comprised those opposed to the common good — such as hoarders of grain or practitioners of buffoonery — as well as trades like barbers, tanners, rope-dancers, and sweepers; butchers and fishermen, whose only occupation was taking life, were also placed here. This section was confined to separate quarters of the city and forbidden, under threat of fine, from associating with others, being marked by “evil disposition and conduct.”
  • The intermediate section encompassed a range of callings and trades — some necessary, such as agriculture; others dispensable, such as dyeing; and still others simple, such as carpentry, ironmongery, or the manufacture of scales and knives. Elsewhere, this category was described as comprising those of amiable disposition who spoke charitably of all men.
• Abul Fazl’s view of the lower classes — the “base” or “ignoble” — reflected, in large measure, the prejudices of the contemporary upper classes.
  • It implied that the lower orders should not aspire to a share in state power, and that administration should remain the preserve of noble families and the upper castes.
  • The prevalence of “evil” sections in society was, in this view, a justification for royal despotism, since only a king endowed with the necessary qualities could keep such sections in check.
  • It was equally the king’s duty to establish social stability by preventing “the dust of sectarian strife” from rising, and to assign each section its proper place — uniting personal ability with due respect for others so that “the world may flourish.” Stability, and even personal dignity, thus implied everyone keeping to their due station in life.
    • Akbar is quoted as instructing his daroghas to watch that “no one from covetousness abandons his own profession,” and he approvingly quoted Shah Tahmasp’s remark that “when a menial takes to learning he does so at the expense of his duties.”
• Despite this strong belief in hierarchy, Abul Fazl was equally concerned with absorbing talented men into royal service regardless of social background.
  • He notes that Akbar, moved by “the spirit of the age,” recognised the value of talent and honoured people of various classes with appointments in the army, raising some from the rank of common soldier to that of grandee.
  • Akbar echoed this view in his advice to Prince Daniyal on being sent to Allahabad: “Judge nobility of caste and high birth from the personality of the individual, and not goodness from ancestors, or greatness from the nobility of the seed.”
• At its core, Abul Fazl’s concept was one of liberal absolutism under a ruler of the highest moral and spiritual endeavour, enjoying heaven’s mandate and therefore independent of any religious establishment for his legitimacy.
  • Though Abul Fazl framed this in the language of old Iranian tradition, the resulting vision — a secular, poly-religious state built on a composite ruling class drawn from different ethnic and religious groups, hierarchical yet reasonably open-ended, humane towards the masses, and founded on the principle of equal justice for all irrespective of birth, religion, or status — was an ideal well ahead of anything conceived or practised elsewhere in Asia or Europe at the time.
  • Notably, Abul Fazl never uses the terms dar-ul-Islam or dar-ul-harb to describe the polity of his day, since he considered such distinctions to have become meaningless — one of the justifications he offers for the abolition of jizyah.
  • Abul Fazl was convinced that Akbar’s conquests were not driven by a spirit of aggrandisement but were part of a larger vision of an all-India polity founded on justice and tolerance — in other words, a state that could rightly be called a dar-ul-sulh.

Structure of Government: Central and Provincial

• Akbar inherited a structure of government rooted in the experience of the Delhi Sultanate. Neither Babur nor Humayun had the time to substantially revise this system, though Sher Shah gave it fresh impetus in the interim.
• Once Akbar had taken firm control of the government — following the suppression of the Uzbek and Mirza rebellions and the conquest of Gujarat — he turned his attention to reorganising the machinery of state.
  • The system he devised carried novel features: the functions and responsibilities of the various departments were carefully demarcated so that they neither encroached upon one another nor operated in isolation, but instead balanced and supported each other — a genuine system of checks and balances.
  • Akbar made little change at the district and sub-district level, where the sarkar and pargana continued to function much as before, apart from some changes in official designations. His more significant contribution lay in developing a provincial administration modelled on the central system.
  • Detailed rules governed both provincial and district administration — recorded in part in the Ain-i-Akbari of Abul Fazl, and later compiled into rule-books called Dastur-ul-Amals. In this way, an essentially bureaucratic system of government gradually took shape, though the ruler himself remained its undisputed centre.

The Vakil

• Although several departments of government existed across the Islamic world and within the Delhi Sultanate, the Central Asian and Timurid tradition favoured a single wazir who supervised all branches of government, including revenue and the military.
  • Babur’s wazir, Nizamuddin Khwaja, was both the political and financial head of government, though primarily a military man who commanded troops at Panipat and Khanwa.
  • Humayun’s wazirs, Amir Wais and Hindu Beg, were similarly influential and oversaw all branches of government, and were likewise primarily soldiers.
• A new situation arose with the appointment of Bairam Khan as vakil and ataliq (guardian) to the young Akbar — he became all-powerful, directing policy, appointing and dismissing top officials, and controlling both revenue and military affairs, effectively wielding the powers of an all-powerful wazir.
• Once Akbar assumed personal control of government, he took deliberate steps to prevent any such concentration of power from recurring.
  • When some of Bairam Khan’s successors, backed by Maham Anaga, tried to exercise similar powers, Akbar’s severe punishment of Adham Khan for stabbing Atka Khan signalled clearly that the vikalat would not be allowed to become a tool of factional politics.
  • Munim Khan was made vakil but never became the effective head of administration.
• In 1564–65, Muzaffar Khan Turbati — an Iranian who had served as Bairam Khan’s diwan — was appointed diwan of the empire, with Todar Mal as his assistant; over time, revenue and financial affairs were gradually separated from the office of the vakil.
  • After the fall of the Uzbeks in 1567, Munim Khan was made governor of Jaunpur and then Bihar, ending his role at the centre; the post of vakil then remained vacant for seven years.
  • In the nineteenth regnal year (1575), Muzaffar Khan was made vakil, combining the posts of vakil and diwan, though he functioned mainly as a financial expert and held the comparatively modest rank of 4000; the joint-diwans of the time, Todar Mal and Shah Mansur, were instructed to work in consultation with him.
  • When Muzaffar Khan was posted to Bengal at the start of the twenty-fourth regnal year (1579), he lost all connection with the central government, and no vakil was appointed for the next decade (1579–1589) — Akbar had made it clear that the post was a favour he could bestow, not an indispensable office.
• In 1595, Mirza Aziz Koka, a favourite of Akbar and his childhood playmate, was made vakil and held the post until Akbar’s death. Though personally influential, he played little real role in administration.
  • As with Munim Khan earlier, his tenure was largely ceremonial: “the power of the vakil was gone but the show of power and marks of outward distinction and prestige were retained.”

The Ministries

• Having curbed the danger of an all-powerful wazir, Akbar organised the central administration into four ministries:
  • The revenue department, headed by the diwan or wazir.
  • The military department, headed by the Mir Bakhshi.
  • The department of Imperial establishments (karkhanas) and the royal household, under the Mir Saman.
  • The judicial and revenue-free (inam) grants department, under the sadr.
• These four ministries were not equal in power: over time, the position of the wazir grew the most powerful, closely followed by that of the Mir Bakhshi.

Diwan

• According to Abul Fazl, the head of the department of income and expenditure was properly called the wazir, though under Akbar the more general terms diwan or diwan-i-ala came into common use.
  • This was partly because Akbar’s diwans were often men of humble social background who had won the emperor’s attention through their skill in revenue affairs; though highly influential and close to the emperor, they were generally not granted high mansabs. Akbar was also still experimenting with the office, at times appointing two or even three men jointly as diwans.
• The diwan’s duties are well documented: he served as the emperor’s lieutenant in financial matters, superintendent of the Imperial treasury, and auditor of all accounts — Abul Fazl, playing down his political role, even calls him “in reality a book keeper.”
  • Under his authority worked the mustaufi (Auditor of Accounts) and the accountants of the various ministries — the army, the royal court, the household, the Imperial workshops, and the diwan of the khalisa.
• Diwans were generally drawn from the class of writers (ahl-i-qalam) rather than warriors, though a few — such as Muzaffar Khan, who also served as vakil, and Raja Todar Mal — were also employed in military operations, underlining that the line between civil and military affairs was not rigid at the time.
• The growth of the diwan’s department began with the appointment of Muzaffar Khan Turbati in the ninth regnal year (1565).
  • Having previously served as Bairam Khan’s vakil and been imprisoned after his patron’s fall, Muzaffar Khan was released by Akbar in recognition of his competence and appointed amil of pargana Pasrur, and then diwan of the bayutat (Imperial karkhanas). His varied experience made him so influential that the emperor consulted him even on the appointment of ministers.
  • Over an eight-and-a-half-year tenure as diwan (1563–1572), Muzaffar Khan carried out several important financial reforms, but power eventually went to his head — he first offended Akbar by abusing him during a game of chaupar, and was exiled to Mecca, only to be recalled en route and made vakil, before being removed once more for opposing certain financial and military reforms.
  • In all, Muzaffar Khan was associated with the finance department for sixteen and a half years, during which capable officials such as Raja Todar Mal and Khwaja Shah Mansur were inducted into the ministry — the very team that carried out the new revenue system known as the dahsala or Ten-Yearly system. This team broke up when Muzaffar Khan was posted to Bengal in 1579.
• In popular memory, the dahsala system is closely associated with Todar Mal, who had earlier earned a reputation as a military engineer by building Fort Rohtas under Sher Shah, though his precise role in Sher Shah’s revenue reforms remains unclear.
  • Todar Mal was associated with the revenue department for several years before being made diwan of Gujarat in 1573, and was soon brought into the central finance department as mushrif-i-diwan in 1575 — a post that, per Abul Fazl, ranked higher than diwan but lower than vakil.
  • It was the team of Todar Mal and Shah Mansur that divided the empire into twelve provinces, each with a governor and a diwan; however, it was Shah Mansur who actually implemented the new dahsala system that had been worked out earlier, since Todar Mal — though tasked with the job — had by then been deputed to Bengal.
  • Shah Mansur fell out of favour for his strictness in enforcing the dagh (horse-branding) system in the newly conquered areas of Bihar and Bengal; though restored to favour soon after, he ran into fresh trouble in 1581, was falsely charged with conspiring with Akbar’s step-brother Mirza Hakim, and was executed — it is widely believed that Todar Mal had the incriminating letters forged, though whether Akbar knew or simply chose to ignore this remains uncertain.
  • Todar Mal was shortly afterwards appointed Diwan-i-ala, a post he held until his death, playing a central role in furthering the dahsala system over the following decade. As was his practice, Akbar also associated other officials, such as Mir Fathullah Shirazi — a great favourite of Akbar — with revenue work, at times even placing Todar Mal under his direction.
  • After Todar Mal’s death, no diwan of comparable stature emerged, but by then the department’s working was well established and could continue under officials of a lower calibre.
• Overall, Akbar assembled a team of highly skilled financial experts and gave them his full backing, while ensuring none felt indispensable.
  • By separating financial from military and political power, Akbar ensured the wazir’s office brought efficiency and responsibility rather than becoming a source of intrigue.
  • Akbar respected his diwans for their efficiency and loyalty but never let discipline slip, taking stern action whenever necessary; though rivalries and personal animosities over rank did occasionally surface, Akbar’s vigilance kept these from affecting the administration.

Mir Bakhshi

• The post of Mir Bakhshi had existed in the Delhi Sultanate since Balban’s time under the name diwan-i-arz. It was well recognised that limiting the powers of the wazir required a separate military department.
  • Its permanent duties included recruitment of the army, inspection of horses, and periodic muster of troops.
• The Mughal Mir Bakhshi held all the powers of the diwan-i-arz, but his influence was even greater, since every noble held a military rank or mansab, and it was the Mir Bakhshi who presented all candidates for appointment before the emperor.
  • He maintained the register of all mansabdars employed in civil and military duties, and every promotion — including appointments to high offices such as vakil, wazir, or sadr — passed through his office.
  • Though not the commander-in-chief, he functioned as paymaster-general and could be called upon to arrange the disposition of troops in battle; the soldiers and horses of mansabdars were presented to him for branding and periodic inspection.
• The Mir Bakhshi also presented all high officers arriving from or departing to the provinces, as well as embassies and distinguished visitors, before the emperor — meaning he or his deputy was invariably present at both the public darbar and the private audience hall.
  • He additionally headed the intelligence department, placing before the king all news-reports sent by the waqia-navis stationed in the provinces, and oversaw arrangements for the palace guard and recommendations for their rewards. He also accompanied the emperor on tour, managing the royal camp and the allotment of places within it to the mansabdars.
• The wazir and the Mir Bakhshi thus emerged as the two leading officials in government, checking and supporting one another: every appointment, once confirmed, went to the wazir’s office for the allotment of a jagir, before being presented to the emperor by the Bakhshi — the same procedure being followed for promotions.

Mir Saman

• Neither the Delhi Sultanate nor the administrative systems of the Islamic countries of West Asia maintained a separate household department of the kind found under the Mughals; the Mir Saman, in charge of the royal household, came to be regarded as head of a ministry on par with the wazir and the Mir Bakhshi.
  • The terms Mir Saman or Khan-i-Saman were not used in Akbar’s time, coming into currency only under Jahangir and Shah Jahan; under Akbar, this office had not yet fully emerged, though we hear of the diwan-i-bayutat, who was in charge of the karkhanas.
• The karkhanas comprised the factories and stores maintained by the central government, dealing in everything from precious stones and pearls to swords, daggers, guns, and artillery.
  • The diwan-i-bayutat also maintained horses and elephants for the army, beasts of burden such as camels and mules for baggage, and animals for the royal hunt — making him an important officer with close ties to the household, the darbar, and the army, and thus, over time, the effective head of a separate ministry as Mir Saman.
• This department not only purchased and stored articles for the king and the inmates of the haram, but was the country’s largest manufacturing agency for both weapons of war and articles of luxury — necessitating close coordination between the Mir Saman and the Mir Bakhshi.
  • Each karkhana was headed by a darogha with specialised knowledge of the article being manufactured, assisted by an accountant and a mushrif. Akbar made a point of visiting these workshops frequently, and did not shrink from watching, or even personally practising, the crafts of ordinary artisans for his own amusement.

Sadr

• The sadr or sadr-us-sadur headed the ulama and served as the king’s chief advisor on the enforcement and interpretation of the sharia.
  • He was also called qazi-ul-quzzat, or head of the judiciary, and appointed qazis throughout the empire — though the king himself remained the final court of appeal, hearing cases with the assistance of a mufti.
  • As Islam’s most distinguished scholar and religious head at court, the sadr wielded a kind of censorship over the education, ideas, and morals of the people, giving him influence that reached every individual in the state.
• A major responsibility of the sadr was awarding subsistence allowances (madad-i-maash) — in cash or land — to deserving scholars, divines, and weaker sections such as women of noble families; this was a tremendous power of patronage, one that some sadrs used for personal enrichment.
  • The most powerful sadr under Akbar was Shaikh Abdun Nabi, who, according to Badayuni, distributed vast tracts of land as madad-i-maash. Akbar held him in great respect for his learning and his family’s reputation for piety, but grew disillusioned when an enquiry revealed bribery, mismanagement, and rapacity in the grants made at his instance.
    • The Shaikh was also found narrow and bigoted, losing Akbar’s sympathy after he executed a prominent Brahman of Mathura on a charge of blasphemy; he was exiled to Mecca in 1579.
• Following this episode, Akbar carried out reforms separating aima (revenue-free grant lands) from khalisa and consolidated them so that grantees were not scattered across different regions, later grouping them into six circles under individual sadrs — and stripping the sadr of the power to independently grant subsistence lands, leaving him only the right to recommend such grants to the emperor.
  • Akbar was keen that deserving Hindu scholars and religious men also benefit from these grants, and accordingly appointed chief sadrs with more tolerant views, “ought to be at peace with every party” (Akbar Nama). Though grants to Hindu holy men were not unknown earlier, they became far more widespread under this policy — even as Hindu rajas and zamindars continued to make their own grants to Hindu holy men and temples.

Provincial Government

• Under the Delhi Sultanate, the empire had no clear division into provinces with fixed boundaries; the holders of iqtas, called muqtis, exercised executive and military power and were expected to assist in land-revenue collection and the maintenance of law and order, particularly the safety of royal highways.
  • Muqtis holding larger, strategically important areas were called walis or amirs; the stable administrative unit throughout remained the sarkar.
• Akbar continued this system until 1580, when the empire — by then extended to include Gujarat, Bihar, and Bengal — was divided into twelve subahs (provinces).
  • The head of administration in a subah was called sipahsalar or commander, though the term subahdar came into use later. He was assisted by a diwan, a bakhshi, a sadr-cum-qazi, a mir-adl for justice, a kotwal, a mir-bahr (superintendent of rivers and ports), and a waqia-navis (news-writer) — all appointed directly by the emperor rather than by the governor, and answerable both to him and to the head of their respective ministry at the centre, extending the principle of checks and balances to provincial government.
  • Orissa, conquered later, was included within Bengal, while Kashmir was included in the subah of Kabul; modern Uttar Pradesh and Haryana formed four provinces — Allahabad, Awadh, Agra, and Delhi. After the empire’s expansion into the Deccan, three further subahs — Khandesh, Berar, and Ahmadnagar — were formed, placed under a viceroy who was often a prince of the blood.
  • In 1586, Akbar experimented with appointing two governors to every province — ostensibly, according to Abul Fazl, so administration would continue uninterrupted if one governor fell ill or was called to court, though the real purpose may have been to limit gubernatorial power. The measure caused needless friction and was abandoned.
    • Interestingly, in several subahs — such as Kabul and Agra — a Muslim noble and a Rajput raja shared joint command, while Lahore and Ajmer were placed exclusively under Rajput rajas.
  • The Ain-i-Akbari records the geographical boundaries of each subah, along with details of its climate, general conditions, products, and history, dividing it further into sarkars and parganas with the assessed income (jama), the castes of the zamindars, and the military strength — cavalry, infantry, and elephants — available in each. Autonomous rajas were not listed separately but folded into the subahs as sarkars and parganas: thus Mewar appears as sarkar Chittor, Kota as a pargana of sarkar Ranthambhor, and Jaipur (Amber) as a pargana of sarkar Ajmer.
  • The subahs varied considerably in size and income — Bengal, with twenty-four sarkars, had an assessed income (jama) of roughly one-and-a-half crore rupees, while Multan, with only three sarkars, yielded barely thirty-seven lakh rupees; other provinces fell somewhere in between.
• Provincial governors, often called vicegerents of the emperor, commanded the provincial army and were responsible for law and order, general administration, and the welfare and prosperity of the people, as their letters of appointment make clear.
  • They assisted the diwan in collecting land revenue by controlling — and, if necessary, punishing — recalcitrant or rebellious zamindars, and in extending cultivation and constructing (or repairing) reservoirs, wells, water-courses, gardens, and sarais.
  • Governors were entrusted with criminal justice, though instructed to exercise the utmost deliberation before inflicting capital punishment, and were expected to tour their provinces regularly, staying informed through trusted spies and news-writers.
    • Significantly, governors were also instructed not to “interfere in anyone’s creed.” They were additionally responsible for collecting tribute from vassal chiefs within their province. There was no fixed term of office, and governors were frequently transferred.
• The diwan was the second most important officer in the subah.
  • Initially, governors could appoint their own diwans, but from 1595 diwans began to be appointed centrally, likely on the recommendation of the chief diwan — henceforth ceasing to be a subordinate of the governor and becoming instead a colleague, even as the governor remained head of the administration.
  • The provincial diwan sent fortnightly reports to the central diwan on financial matters and cash balances, and was responsible for the collection, auditing, and accounting of land revenue and other taxes.
    • A principal duty was to extend and improve cultivation with the help of the amils in the sarkars, while also checking their extortion and supervising their work; he also oversaw lands granted for charitable purposes.
• The bakhshi and sadr of the subah mirrored the duties of their counterparts at the centre — the bakhshi also serving as head of provincial intelligence, which sometimes brought him into conflict with the governor if he reported against the latter’s conduct to the court, while the sadr recommended grants to religious men and headed the judiciary.
  • Akbar, dissatisfied with the performance of the qazis, appointed a mir-adl as a dedicated judicial officer in the provinces, with the qazi acting as his assistant.
• The kotwal was responsible for law and order within the city, along with general civic amenities such as weights and measures, and the control of gambling houses and brothels.
• A provincial governor thus headed a team of officers, each zealous of his own privileges and each possessing direct access to the centre — managing them required considerable tact and skill.
  • These checks and balances could function only under a capable sovereign at the centre, supported by a skilful and cohesive team of officials. Akbar’s careful watch on provincial governors — through news-reporters, spies, personal tours to hear public grievances, and action against oppressive officials — proved effective in curbing regional separatism; on occasion, he also appointed high officials to specifically enquire into complaints against provincial or local officers.
  • Thus, Akbar built a provincial system that acted both as a link to local administrative units and as a transmission belt of information to the centre.

District and Local Government

• Provinces were further divided into sarkars and parganas for administrative purposes.
  • Each sarkar was headed by a faujdar, responsible for general government and law and order, including the safety of roads, and expected to assist the amalguzar, who handled the assessment and collection of land revenue.
    • The faujdar bore the day-to-day burden of administration and has often been compared to the district collector under British rule, though his precise duties differed — notably, he also commanded local armed forces but was not directly responsible for revenue collection.
  • The qazi handled criminal justice as well as civil law among Muslims, or in disputes where one party was Muslim.
• Each sarkar was in turn divided into several parganas, each with a shiqdar for general administration, an amil for revenue assessment and collection, a treasurer, a qanungo who determined pargana and village boundaries and maintained local revenue records, and various clerks (karkuns).

The Working of Government

The Ruler

• As the centre of government, the ruler’s own conduct of public business set the standard widely emulated by the nobility; Akbar established the practice of appearing three times each day for state business.
  • His first appearance came in the morning after sunrise, in the form of the jharoka darshan — an innovation of Akbar’s designed to establish a personal bond with his subjects, allowing them to submit petitions and present cases directly, with decisions sometimes taken on the spot (or, later under Shah Jahan, recorded by judicial clerks for the ruler’s later attention). The jharoka was occasionally also used for viewing animal fights or reviewing noble contingents.
    • As Akbar’s prestige grew, some people made it a rule not to eat or drink until they had had darshan of the king — a striking demonstration of the old Indian tradition of attaching divinity to kingship.
  • After jharoka darshan, Akbar proceeded to the public audience hall, the diwan-i-khas-o-am, where anyone — high or low — could present a petition or case in person. According to Badayuni, “Huge crowds assembled and there was much bustle.” Here officers arriving from or departing for postings were received, news-letters from the provinces read out, and all nobles present at court were required to attend; Akbar spent roughly four-and-a-half hours (one-and-a-half pahars) here daily.
  • His second appearance came in the afternoon, when he reviewed the condition of horses, elephants, and transport animals, and toured the various karkhanas to attend to routine business.
    • The Jesuit priest Monserrate, whom Akbar had invited from Goa, records that Akbar had built a workshop near the palace where finer arts — painting, goldsmith work, tapestry, carpet-making, and even arms manufacture — were practised, and that “hither he very frequently comes and relaxes his mind with watching those who practice their arts.”
  • Between these two appearances, Akbar retired to the royal household for a meal and rest, hearing petitions from the ladies of the haram. Confidential state business was then conducted in the evening at the ghusal-khana (bathroom) — so named because it lay between the diwan-i-am and the female apartments, and was the room where Akbar bathed before admitting a few trusted persons to see him; over time, the diwan, the bakhshi, and several other nobles were also admitted.
    • Shah Jahan later renamed it the Daulat Khana-i-Khas, though the older term persisted — so much so that the post of darogha of the ghusal-khana became an influential one, since its holder controlled and monitored who entered.
  • The Diwan-i-Khas was also used to bring together “the learned, the wise, and the truth-seekers” for discussions on various subjects, as recorded in the Ain-i-Akbari; Akbar generally retired late at night after listening to music.
• Akbar thus tried to remain accessible to a genuine cross-section of the people.
  • The Jesuits were struck by his pleasant, affable manner of speaking with nobles and commoners alike, remarking that “it was hard to exaggerate how accessible he makes himself to all who wish audience of him.” This desire for closeness with his subjects at times led him to unconventional methods — Abul Fazl records that in 1560–61, during a large gathering near Agra for the celebrations at the tomb of the popular saint Salar Masud Ghazi at Baharaich (modern western UP), Akbar went incognito, “observing the various sorts and conditions of humanity,” and narrowly escaped recognition by some ruffians by rolling his eyes to alter his appearance. No earlier Muslim ruler in India is recorded to have ventured out alone among the people in this manner.
• Akbar’s lasting contribution to the working of government was thus twofold: establishing a routine strictly followed by his successors until the reign of Bahadur Shah I, and bringing the monarchy closer and more accessible to the people in a variety of ways.

The Land Revenue System

• The land revenue system that emerged under Akbar was the culmination of developments that had begun well before the Delhi Sultanate.
  • Attempts to realise land revenue in cash, and to devise a system of measurement that would avoid the need for a large body of officials to assess produce at harvest time, had already been made in parts of India before the arrival of the Turkish rulers.
  • Under Alauddin Khalji, an attempt was made to assess land revenue on individual cultivators in the upper doab, so that the burden of the strong would not fall on the weak — though how far this succeeded remains speculative. He also introduced a system of land measurement, distinct from the one later introduced by Sher Shah and further developed by Akbar.
• Before examining the actual system of land-revenue administration, it is worth noting the basic approach of the ruling classes on the subject.
  • Ziauddin Barani records that Ghiyasuddin Tughlaq’s policy was that “the Hindus (i.e., the cultivators) were to be taxed so that they may not be blinded by wealth, and so become discontented and rebellious, nor, on the other hand, be so reduced to poverty and destitution as to be unable to pursue their husbandry.” Some modern historians read this as a deliberate policy of keeping peasants at bare subsistence — though this obscures the considerable differences that existed even then in landholding size, agricultural assets, and economic status among villagers.
  • It has also been argued that medieval rulers sought only to maximise land-revenue collection at all times, a reading that overstates the pressure on cultivators: from Muhammad bin Tughlaq’s time onward, it was repeatedly emphasised that once revenue demand had reached its maximum, further increases could come only through the expansion and improvement of cultivation — even though there were undoubtedly phases when conditions for cultivators became unbearable, leading to crisis and breakdown.
• The evolution of Akbar’s revenue system, culminating in the dahsala or Ten-Year system in his 24th regnal year (1579), was a logical extension of the measurement system (zabt) introduced by Sher Shah, which continued to operate in Hindustan — the region from Lahore to Allahabad — into the early years of Akbar’s reign.
  • During Bairam Khan’s regency, the large number of claimants led to the jama (assessment) being artificially inflated, causing considerable discontent and infighting among the nobility.
  • After taking full charge of administration in 1562, Akbar attempted reform: Asaf Khan, an Irani, was appointed wazir but achieved little and was removed. Aitmad Khan, a trusted eunuch appointed diwan of the khalisa (crown lands), effected reforms that relieved Akbar’s immediate financial worries by separating khalisa lands from jagir lands after an enquiry into the income of different categories of land — apparently ensuring the most productive lands were retained as crown land. Badayuni simply notes that “unprecedented economy was effected in expenditure.”
  • Until the tenth regnal year (1566), Sher Shah’s crop-rate (ray) continued unchanged, converted into a cash rate (dastur-ul-amal or dastur) using a single price-list — a system that caused distress, since it was based on prices prevailing in the royal camp, generally higher than those in the countryside, forcing peasants elsewhere to pay proportionately more. The deeper problem, however, was that the state still lacked accurate knowledge of the actual state of cultivation and productivity, without which no proper assessment could be made.
  • In the eleventh regnal year (1567), Muzaffar Khan and Raja Todar Mal brought about a major change: qanungos were asked to supply information on cultivated and uncultivated land, produce, and revenue figures (taqsimat). Statements for the khalisa areas from 1567–71 were verified by ten senior qanungos, and the earlier inflated jama-i-raqmi — in use since Bairam Khan’s time — was set aside in favour of a fresh estimate for the whole empire. On this basis, crop-rates began to be converted into cash using region-specific prices rather than a single empire-wide rate, as reflected in the “nineteen-year price rates” recorded by Abul Fazl in the Ain for 1562–1579.
    • For instance, in subah Agra, the cash-rate for wheat ranged from 56–60 dams per bigha in the eleventh year, to 36–74 dams by the seventeenth year — though it remains unclear whether these variations reflected changes in price alone, or also in productivity.
  • State demand was initially calculated through annual measurement, later replaced by estimation (kankut) — an improvement, but still unsatisfactory, since qanungos, being local zamindars themselves, had little incentive to disclose the full state of affairs, and the system left ample scope for corruption by local officials. Since price-lists from the regions also had to be scrutinised and approved by the court — a process complicated by the emperor’s uncertain movements as the empire expanded — delays were interminable, and, in Abul Fazl’s own terse words, “abundant distress used to occur.”

The Dahsala System

• Incomplete information and the rapid expansion of the empire compounded these problems, forming the backdrop to the dahsala or Ten-Year rates, proclaimed in the 24th regnal year (1579), under which state demand was expressed as a cash rate based on local productivity and local prices.
• Two preliminary steps preceded this measure:
  • In the nineteenth regnal year (1574), officials called amils — popularly known as karoris — were placed in charge of lands expected to yield a krore of tankas, or two-and-a-half lakh rupees. Assisted by a treasurer, a surveyor, and other technical staff, the karori was to measure village land, assess the cultivated area, and — per some accounts — survey uncultivated (banjar) land and encourage its cultivation, ideally within three years. This was an unrealistic target, and many karoris were penalised for falling short; the experiment’s real purpose appears to have been the measurement of cultivated area, since this was also the year in which a new jarib (measuring rod of bamboo joined by iron rings) replaced the old hempen-rope jarib, which expanded when wet and invited abuse. This experiment was confined to the settled provinces from Lahore to Allahabad.
  • A second step, in 1576, brought the region from Lahore to Allahabad under khalisa or direct crown administration — a move that, combined with the introduction of the horse-branding (dagh) system, caused serious discontent among sections of the nobility. This appears to have been intended chiefly to gather first-hand agricultural data rather than to abolish the jagir system outright, as some modern historians have argued; once the needed information was gathered, the jagir system was restored.
• By 1579, sufficient experience had accumulated on crop yields and local prices. Lands were accordingly grouped into assessment circles (also called dasturs), and, per Abul Fazl, the crops, sown area, and produce prices in each pargana over the preceding ten years were “ascertained,” with one-tenth of this fixed as the annual revenue demand.
  • State demand was thus no longer based on a single crop-rate converted into cash, but on a series of cash-rates tied to crop and sown area — an arrangement that let the state estimate its likely income as soon as crops were sown and the area measured (zabt), and which benefited the peasant to some extent, even as it shifted much of the risk of cultivation onto his shoulders.
  • It should be clarified that dahsala did not imply a ten-year settlement, but rather an assessment based on the average of produce and prices over the preceding decade — itself calculated afresh from fresh information rather than simply averaging past cash-rates. High-value cash crops such as cotton, indigo, sugarcane, oilseeds, poppy, and vegetables, always charged in cash, were assessed differently: given their wide price fluctuations, a particularly good season was chosen as the basis for the revenue demand.
• Both productivity and continuity of cultivation were factored into the state demand, with land classified as follows:
  • Polaj — land continually under cultivation.
  • Parauti — land left fallow for a year, charged full rates once brought back under cultivation.
  • Chachar — land fallow for three to four years (e.g., due to inundation), charged at a progressive rate, reaching the full rate in the third year.
  • Banjar — cultivable wasteland, charged full rates only from the fifth year, to encourage its reclamation.
• Land was further classified as good, bad, or middling, with the state’s share generally fixed at one-third of average produce — though this rose to one-fourth in areas like Multan and Rajasthan, and to one-half in Kashmir, where saffron was cultivated.
• The formal land-revenue demand should not be confused with what a peasant actually paid in practice — it excluded various additional cesses (on cattle, trees, etc.), the share claimed by zamindars and local officials (qanungo, muqaddam, patwari), and the costs of village upkeep. Even so, land revenue remained by far the heaviest demand a peasant faced, enforceable, if unmet, through measures as severe as ejectment or loss of life.

The Working of the Dahsala System

• The dahsala system, based on measurement (zabt), was introduced across the region from Lahore to Allahabad, as well as in Gujarat, Malwa, and parts of Bihar and Multan — though it is unlikely that zabt ever covered the entirety of any province.
  • Per the Ain, amalguzars were instructed to accept whichever system of assessment the cultivator preferred; besides zabt, the prevalent systems were kankut (appraisement) and batai (crop-sharing).
• In kankut, the land was measured — either with the jarib or by pacing — and standing crops assessed by inspection; where there was doubt, crops were cut and divided into good, middling, and inferior lots to strike a balance. As Abul Fazl notes, “often, too, the land taken by appraisement gives a sufficiently accurate return.”
• Batai or crop-sharing came in three forms:
  • Bhaoli — crops reaped and stacked, then divided by agreement in the presence of both parties.
  • Khet batai — fields divided after sowing.
  • Lang batai — grain divided into heaps after cutting.
  • This method required a large body of vigilant inspectors, without which deception was common.
• In Kashmir, following practice in parts of Central Asia, produce was computed on the basis of kharwar (ass-loads) and then divided.
• Another assessment system, nasaq, remains a matter of considerable debate among historians — some describe it as group assessment, others as estimation based on prior assessment.
  • Under nasaq, peasants were offered an estimate based on the previous assessment (whether zabt, batai, or otherwise); if they refused, a fresh assessment could be made, allowing annual measurement or appraisement to be avoided. Over time, nasaq based on zabt appears to have become the standard system, with batai remaining an option, particularly after repeated crop failures.
  • Similarly, while the state preferred cash payment, peasants had the option of paying in cash or kind based on crop-sharing — sometimes paying one season’s crop in cash and the other in kind. Whenever the state’s share was collected in kind, it was invariably sold and converted to cash, as seventeenth-century revenue records from Rajasthan indicate — showing the system to be considerably more flexible in practice than official accounts suggest.
• Historians have also debated whether the state assessed the individual cultivator or the village as a whole.
  • As with Alauddin Khalji earlier, the Mughal position held that group assessment would shift the burden of the rich onto the poor — though this was not rooted in any notion of peasant egalitarianism, since medieval society, urban and rural alike, remained sharply hierarchical, divided between the privileged (ashraf) and the unprivileged (ajlaf). Group assessment was opposed chiefly because it concealed the true state of village agriculture, causing the government to lose the opportunity to charge as much as the village could bear — hence the emphasis on assessing land revenue on the individual cultivator’s actual holding.
  • The state further encouraged cultivators to pay directly — to the Imperial treasury if the land lay in khalisa, or to the jagirdar’s agent if assigned in jagir. But village realities complicated this: much of the country remained under the control of zamindars or chiefs, who paid the state only a stipulated sum as peshkash.
  • Since Alauddin Khalji’s time, the state had sought to survey the actual state of village agriculture in order to levy revenue based on real cultivation — measurement (zabt) being the most effective means of doing so. Akbar’s great achievement was securing, to a considerable degree, the cooperation of the zamindars — represented by the qanungo — in this task, though largely confined to the settled tract between Lahore and Allahabad. To secure this cooperation, zamindars were permitted to collect their traditional dues, and were granted a percentage of the land revenue they helped collect.
• Much has been made of the state’s practice of issuing a patta or qabuliat (letter of acceptance) to the peasant, recording the area sown, the crop, the schedule of payment, and the amount due.
  • Since most peasants were illiterate, the patta had little direct meaning for them, but it served as a device by which the state could verify actual collections made by the village headman or zamindar.
  • Thus, while assessment rested on the individual cultivator, the responsibility for collection lay with the village headman, the zamindar, or both — leaving considerable room in practice for zamindars or more prosperous cultivators to manipulate assessments in their favour or conceal their holdings. Zamindars also remained socially powerful in many regions owing to difficult terrain and caste or clan ties with the dominant peasant groups. Despite these limitations, state control over the villages in this tract was more extensive than ever before.
• On the question of whether the dahsala assessment was permanent or periodically revised, it appears to have been permanent for all practical purposes, since no fresh settlement was carried out either for the rest of Akbar’s reign or under his successors.
  • This did not mean the state gained nothing from the expansion or improvement of cultivation, nor that peasants had no recourse in the face of natural disasters or falling prices.
    • Banjar (uncultivated wasteland), extensive at the time, paid revenue at concessional rates for four years once brought under cultivation. Per the Ain, the amalguzar was instructed to bring wasteland under cultivation and ensure existing cultivation did not lapse, and — “should there be no waste land in a village and a husbandman is capable of adding to his cultivation” — to allot him land in another village. Amalguzars were further instructed to extend agricultural loans (taqavi) for seed and implements in times of drought, or to reclaim banjar land, along with assistance for digging or repairing wells, and concessions to encourage superior or cash crops.
    • Price movements were also factored in: the Akbar Nama records that in the 43rd regnal year (1598), Akbar’s prolonged stay at Lahore pushed up local prices, prompting a 20 per cent increase in revenue demand in the region — discontinued once he departed and prices fell. Conversely, in the 30th and 31st years (1585–86), a sharp fall in prices due to an exceptionally good harvest led to substantial reductions in demand across Delhi, Allahabad, and Awadh.
    • Remissions were similarly granted in cases of drought, by declaring part of the cultivated area “not sown” (nabud) — though such remissions were often tardy and insufficient, contributing, along with the heavy scale of demand, to a build-up of arrears.
  • Under Todar Mal, the government appears to have dealt harshly with amils to recover these arrears, which in turn led to harshness towards peasants — serious enough that Akbar set up a Commission of Enquiry in 1585.
    • The Commission’s findings revealed considerable abuse: arrears sometimes inflated because demand was based on guesswork rather than actual sown area; occasionally, even lands that had gone out of cultivation were assessed; amils were harassed through arbitrary arrest or the withholding of pay against possible arrears, or left unpaid for additional staff hired for measurement or crowd control. Corrupt amils were ordered to refund amounts illegally collected from peasants, and, partly on the Commission’s recommendation, a standard rate was fixed for the remuneration of measuring parties, payable by the cultivators.
  • Around this time, a new measuring yard, the gaz-i-Ilahi, replaced the older gaz-i-Sikandari — at 41 digits, or roughly 33 inches, it was 14 per cent longer than its predecessor, enlarging the bigha (60×60 yards) by 10.5 per cent and necessitating a revision of the dasturs for both kharif and rabi crops; the rates recorded in the Ain reflect these revised figures.
• In sum, the land revenue system evolved from a uniform grain-rate valued at a single price, to local grain-rates valued at local prices, and finally — once this broke down under the pressure of rapid imperial expansion — to a schedule of cash-rates fixed on productivity and crops sown, based on past experience. Measurement (zabt) remained the preferred method even as other systems continued alongside it or took over after breakdowns, with annual measurement gradually giving way to appraisement (nasaq) as the system stabilised — a stability that, in turn, aided the ongoing expansion and improvement of cultivation.

The Mansabdari System and the Army

• The mansabdari system was a distinctive Mughal innovation. In its broadest sense, the mansab or rank awarded to an individual fixed his status within the official hierarchy, his salary, and the number of armed retainers (tabinan) he was required to maintain for state service.
  • A mansab-holder could be assigned any administrative or military post, or simply kept in attendance at court — making mansabdari a single, unified service combining both civil and military responsibility.
• Salaries could be paid in cash but were generally paid through the grant of a jagir, which carried the right to collect all payments due to the state from that land.
  • Mansabs ranged from 10 to 5,000, spread across sixty-six categories rising in multiples of 10 up to 100, and thereafter by 50 or 100 — though it is uncertain whether all sixty-six grades were actually in use, the figure itself possibly being a notional, sacred number.
  • Though mansabdar was technically a generic term, in common usage only those holding ranks up to 500 were called mansabdars; those from 500 to 2,500 were amirs, and those above 2,500 were amir-i-umda or amir-i-azam (later, this threshold shifted, with all those below 1,000 being called mansabdars).
  • In theory, since it was a single unified service, an individual entered at the lowest rank and rose through it — though the emperor could, and often did, appoint distinguished individuals directly at a higher level, a practice extended to hereditary chiefs and rajas as well.
  • Mansabs above 5,000 up to 10,000 were reserved for princes of the blood, though towards the end of Akbar’s reign, two nobles — Mirza Aziz Koka (Akbar’s foster-brother) and Raja Man Singh (linked to him by marriage) — were exceptionally raised to the rank of 7,000. This remained, with one exception, the ceiling for any noble through Aurangzeb’s reign, even as ranks granted to princes eventually rose as high as 40,000 zat.

Evolution of the Mansabdari System

• The numbered gradation of mansabs is often traced back to Chingiz Khan, who divided his army into units from 10 to 10,000. Mongol influence introduced ranks such as yuz-bushi (commander of 100) or hazara (commander of 1,000), though such numerical ranks had not yet become universal.
  • Some Mongol nobles held the title “commander of a tuman” (10,000), used to denote the highest rank rather than an actual troop count, which in practice could be as little as one-tenth of that figure.
  • Under the Lodis and Surs, nobles are recorded holding ranks of 20,000, 10,000, or 5,000 sawars — again with little clarity on the actual number of horsemen commanded. The systematic division of Mughal service into a regular hierarchy of grades from 10 to 5,000 was thus a genuinely unique contribution, credited to Akbar.
  • There is general agreement that Akbar effected this numerical division of mansabs in his eleventh regnal year (1567). Though Abul Fazl assigns mansab ranks even to nobles like Bairam Khan who had died earlier, this appears to be his way of indicating relative status within the hierarchy — other contemporary historians, such as Nizamuddin, who served as bakhshi and dealt directly with military organisation, do not ascribe ranks to anyone who died before 1567.
• It remains difficult to determine how many horsemen a mansabdar actually maintained in this early period, since the jama was then highly inflated.
  • As the state gained a clearer picture of cultivation and likely revenue realisation (hasil), Akbar sought to narrow the gap between nominal and actual cavalry strength, chiefly through the introduction of the branding (dagh) system in the eighteenth regnal year (1573–74).
    • Under this system, the descriptive roll of every soldier maintained by a mansabdar was recorded, and the number and quality of horses periodically inspected; those who failed to comply were penalised, and promotions were tied to compliance.
    • According to the historian Badayuni, himself a mansabdar of 20, a noble would first be awarded a mansab of 20 to serve in the guard, palace, or fort; once he had presented these twenty horsemen for branding as per regulation, he could be raised to a mansab of 100, and thereafter — depending on capacity and Imperial favour — to 1,000, 2,000, or even 5,000.
  • The dagh system met with resistance from the nobility — senior figures such as Munim Khan and Muzaffar Khan (then vakil) were reluctant to present their contingents for branding, and Mirza Aziz Koka was demoted and placed under surveillance for refusing to comply.
    • The system also placed considerable power in the hands of junior officials, who at times used it to harass even senior, respected nobles; harsh methods adopted by some diwans contributed to a serious rebellion in Bengal and Bihar in 1580, which Akbar subsequently sought to address.
  • Despite the rigour of the dagh system, mansabdars were often found not maintaining their required number of sawars. Badayuni himself admits to falling short, noting that fellow mansabdars similarly failed to maintain their fixed cavalry strength — bringing borrowed men and horses to the muster, then dismissing them soon after while retaining the jagir revenue assigned for their upkeep.

Zat and Sawar Ranks

• This was the background against which the dual rank of zat and sawar was introduced in the 40th regnal year (1595–96).
  • According to Abul Fazl, mansabdars fell into three categories: those who maintained sawars equal to their mansab number; those who maintained half or more of it; and those whose sawars fell below half.
  • It was around this time that the term zat came to denote a personal rank — Abul Fazl notes that in the 41st year, “the rank of Mirza Shahrukh has been enhanced and pay assignment made to him for 5,000 zat, with half the sawars.”
• There has long been considerable controversy over the precise meaning of zat and sawar, largely because the mansab system is now understood to have evolved gradually — functioning differently in the early phase up to 1594–95, when there was only a single rank, than in the dual system introduced thereafter.
  • Under the dual zat-sawar system (post-1595–96), zat indicated a noble’s personal pay and status, while sawar indicated the actual number of horsemen he was expected to maintain — meaning a mansabdar of 4,000 zat but only 2,000 sawar ranked higher than one holding 3,000 zat and 3,000 sawar.
  • The zat rank also determined the number of horses, elephants, beasts of burden, and carts a mansabdar was expected to maintain: a mansabdar of 5,000 zat, for instance, was required to maintain 340 horses, 100 elephants, 140 camels, 100 mules, and 160 carts (mansabdars of 400 or below were exempt from this requirement). The quality of horses — Iraqi, Turki, Yabu (mixed), and Jungla (Indian) — and of elephants was clearly specified.
    • It remains uncertain whether the cost of maintaining these animals came out of the zat salary or was paid separately, “so that the keeping of the animals was an advantage and not a burden” — plausible given that the highly mobile Mughal army, with nobles frequently on the march or under transfer, needed a reliable transport corps. Abul Fazl makes clear that not only sawars and their mounts, but also beasts of burden, had to be presented for the dagh.

The Zat and Sawar Salaries

• The state carefully regulated both the number and quality of horses a sawar was expected to maintain, following the general rule that ten sawars should maintain twenty horses — the dah-bisti or “ten-twenty” system (three troopers with 3 horses each = 9; four troopers with 2 horses each = 8; three troopers with 1 horse each = 3; total 20 horses).
  • This ensured cavalry mobility, the Mughals’ principal fighting arm; a second horse served as a replacement in case the primary mount was tired, injured, or killed.
• A sawar’s salary depended on both the number and quality of horses he maintained.
  • A trooper with an Iraqi horse earned Rs. 30 per month; with a mujannas (mixed) horse, Rs. 25; with a Turki horse, Rs. 20; and with a yabu, Rs. 18, and so on.
  • Before the dagh system, salaries under Akbar were structured as follows: Mughal, Afghan, and Indian Muslim troopers earned Rs. 25/month with three horses, Rs. 20/month with two, and Rs. 15/month with one; a Rajput trooper earned Rs. 20/month with three horses and Rs. 15/month with two (Abul Fazl does not record the rate for a Rajput with a single horse, though it may have been around Rs. 12/month).
    • This lower pay scale for Rajputs was discriminatory, but had the secondary effect of encouraging non-Rajput nobles to recruit Rajput troopers, since Mughal and Rajput nobles were permitted to employ men only from their own ethnic group, while all others had to maintain mixed contingents.
  • Final salaries were fixed after the dagh muster, based on the quality of horses actually presented; on the dah-bisti system, the average annual salary of a sawar before dagh under Akbar came to roughly Rs. 240. The mansabdar himself was permitted to retain 5 per cent of the total sawar salary for his general expenses, meaning the jagir granted to a mansabdar effectively combined his own zat salary with the salary due to his contingent, calculated by his sawar rank.
• Zat salaries themselves varied by category — whether a noble’s sawar rank equalled, exceeded half of, or fell below half of his zat rank.
  • Salaries were calculated in dams, with one rupee equal to 40 dams; jagir values were similarly reckoned in dams, giving rise to the term jama-dami for the revenue assessment behind a jagir grant. A noble holding 5,000 zat in the first category received Rs. 30,000/month; in the second category, Rs. 29,000/month; and in the third, Rs. 28,000/month — a scale that carried down proportionately to the lowest mansabdars (a mansabdar of 1,000, for instance, received Rs. 8,100/month in the second category and Rs. 8,000/month in the third).
  • Thus, while sawar salaries were paid separately, a noble’s own zat salary rose in line with the size of the contingent he maintained.
  • Nobles were also expected to make annual presents to the emperor — who sometimes returned gifts worth more than what he received — and bore the cost of establishment for collecting land revenue from their jagirs, which did not exceed one-fourth of the salary. Even so, salaries remained extremely generous by any measure, attracting able men from far and wide.
    • As Badayuni observed, “Scarcely a day passes away on which qualified and zealous men are not appointed to mansabs or promoted to higher dignities. Many Arabians and Persians also came from distant countries in the army, whereby they obtain the object of their desires.”
• It is difficult to estimate the total number of mansabdars in service at any given time under Akbar.
  • The figures Abul Fazl gives for the 40th regnal year include all nobles, living or dead, who had served over the preceding forty years, and both he and Nizamuddin Ahmad list only those holding ranks of 500 or above. Du Jarric, writing in the early years of Jahangir’s reign, records 2,941 mansabdars ranked from 10 to 5,000 — a figure that appears reasonable, given that both Man Singh and Aziz Koka held ranks of 7,000.
  • Of these, only 150 (about 5.1 per cent) held ranks of 2,500 or above — and it was precisely this small group that occupied all the important civil and military posts in the empire, forming a kind of carefully selected, personalised bureaucracy wholly dependent on the ruler, whose skill, dedication, and organising ability were essential to the proper functioning of the state.
• Some historians have argued the empire would have been more stable had Akbar simply paid his nobles in cash — an argument that overlooks the complex social realities of the time.
  • Collecting land revenue in a countryside where the local population was armed, and headed by landed elites (zamindars) with close clan and caste ties to the cultivating community, was a task fraught with difficulty. Assigning jagirs to nobles gave them a direct, vested interest in collecting the revenue due to the state — a system that, though it opened the door to local oppression, was still easier to manage than direct state dealings with a mass of potentially recalcitrant peasants.
  • Akbar did briefly bring the tract from Lahore to Allahabad under khalisa (direct administration) in 1576, mainly to gather more accurate agricultural data, resuming the allotment of jagirs to nobles once this purpose was served. Control over land, moreover, carried its own social prestige and served as a form of security for payment.

The Army

• The Mughal army comprised cavalry, infantry, artillery, elephants, and camels; there was no navy in the modern sense, though a flotilla of boats operated under an amir-ul-bahr (“Lord of the Sea,” or Admiral).
  • Considerable misunderstanding surrounds the actual strength and efficiency of the Mughal army. Its success under Akbar rested not on luck alone — though luck certainly played its part — but on the quality of its leadership and the confidence it inspired, built above all on a skilful combination of cavalry, artillery, and elephants, with infantry playing a supporting role.
• The cavalry was regarded as the flower of the army, and the emperor spared no expense in keeping it efficient and well-equipped, chiefly through the dagh system.
  • Cavalrymen rode choice horses from Iraq, Iran, and Arabia, wore iron helmets and other defensive armour, and rode mounts with their necks, chests, and backs fully covered, armed with swords, lances, and bows.
  • The state did not itself pay for a trooper’s horse or armour — he had to purchase and present his own mount at muster before receiving pay, a practice that invited harassment and corruption. To address this, mansabdars were granted an ad hoc advance called barawardi on appointment, adjusted once the full pay was granted after muster — though this too became a source of abuse, as nobles delayed musters, maintained only a nominal force, and drew barawardi for their full sanctioned contingent.
    • In some cases, the state directly recruited and paid soldiers (called dakhili) and assigned them to high-ranking mansabdars.
  • A separate category of troopers, the ahadis or “gentlemen troopers,” maintained five or more horses each and were paid handsomely, with their own muster-master or diwan; they could be deployed anywhere in the army, act as messengers, or even serve under a mansabdar.
• Artillery had developed rapidly in India following Babur’s arrival.
  • Beyond siege guns, heavy guns were also mounted on forts. Siege guns were cumbersome, sometimes requiring elephants and thousands of bullocks to move, and — though prized as symbols of prestige — were slow to fire and of doubtful effectiveness against fortifications, as the siege of Chittor demonstrated; mining beneath fort walls with gunpowder was consequently the preferred method of assault.
  • Alongside heavy artillery, several types of light artillery existed: narnal (carried by a man), gajnal (mounted on elephants), and shutrnal (mounted on camels) — essentially light swivel-guns, with camels trained to lie down when the mounted gun was fired.
  • Little is known of field-guns or guns on wheeled carriages (arraba), which were used at Panipat and Khanwa, though such carriages may have existed even earlier.
  • Akbar took a personal interest in improving artillery design — inventing a gun that could be dismantled and reassembled as needed, improving wheeled gun-carriages, and devising a mechanism whereby seventeen guns, placed close together, could be fired in rapid succession from a single match. He was equally engaged with improving hand-muskets (matchlocks three feet to two yards long), even devising a machine, drawn by an ox, to bore and clean gun-barrels.
• Thousands of elephants were maintained for war under Akbar, carefully graded and armoured — carrying war materials, royalty, and important nobles, and, combined with cavalry, forming a kind of battering ram or protective shield, though they tended to become unmanageable when surrounded by hostile cavalry.
• The infantry, though numerous, comprised both fighting and non-fighting elements.
  • The fighting core consisted of matchlock-men (banduqchis), organised under their own clerks, treasurer, and darogha, and subdivided into classes with salaries ranging from 110 to 300 dams per month; dakhili soldiers — recruited and paid directly by the central government before being handed to high mansabdars — were largely foot-soldiers and matchlock-men.
  • A quarter of the fighting force comprised bearers of matchlocks, carpenters, blacksmiths, water-carriers, and pioneers who cleared the way, alongside runners, palki-bearers, wrestlers, and slaves who served as ancillaries — necessary for the army’s overall efficiency, but at times confusingly counted alongside actual combatants, inflating perceived troop numbers. Palace guards and spies were maintained in addition to all of these.
• Estimating the true strength of Akbar’s army remains difficult.
  • According to Monserrate, writing in 1581, “there are forty-five thousand cavalry, five thousand elephants, and many thousands infantry, paid directly from the royal treasury.”
  • The cavalry maintained by individual mansabdars is harder to assess, since in the early period a mansab did not denote the actual number of sawars maintained, and even after the sawar rank was introduced, figures survive for only a few nobles. It can reasonably be assumed, however, that the cavalry maintained by the nobles was not less than that maintained centrally — putting the empire’s total cavalry strength, both central and noble-held, at not less than 100,000. The strength of the infantry and artillery, by contrast, remains unknown.