The artificially fixed rupee-sterling exchange rate prescribed by the Hilton-Young Commission (1926) was adopted by the British Government for which one of the following reasons?
- Aiding the flow of remittances from India and maintaining India’s creditworthiness
- Providing support to Indian importers
- Encouraging export of cotton produce from India
- Preventing depreciation of the Rupee in terms of gold
Answer: (a) Aiding the flow of remittances from India and maintaining India’s creditworthiness
- Option (a) is correct: The Hilton-Young Commission recommended fixing the ratio at 1s 6d (1 shilling and 6 pence per rupee), overvaluing the rupee compared to its natural market rate of 1s 4d. The British government enforced this because it lowered the cost of their “Home Charges”—the sterling remittances sent from India to London to cover colonial administrative costs, British military pensions, and interest on debt. Overvaluing the rupee made it cheaper for the Government of India to purchase sterling, preserving its financial solvency in London at the expense of India’s domestic economy.
- Option (b) is incorrect: While an overvalued currency does make imports cheaper, helping British manufacturers dump finished goods into the Indian market, benefiting domestic Indian importers was never the policy goal.
- Option (c) is incorrect: A higher exchange rate makes Indian goods more expensive abroad. This policy severely hurt Indian agricultural exports (like raw cotton, wheat, and jute), triggering widespread agrarian distress.
- Option (d) is incorrect: This move was not about protecting the rupee’s value in gold; it was about tying the rupee directly to sterling to keep India integrated into the British imperial currency zone.
The Hilton-Young Commission and the “Ratio Controversy”
- The Mandate (1926): Officially known as the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, headed by Edward Hilton Young. Its structural mandate was to suggest a stable currency system for India and recommend the creation of a central bank (which eventually led to the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934).
- The Exchange Rate Peg: The commission recommended fixing the Rupee-Sterling exchange rate at an artificially high value of 1s 6d (1 shilling 6 pence) per rupee, instead of the historically preferred pre-war rate of 1s 4d.
- The Imperial Fiscal Rationale: The British colonial administration adopted this overvalued peg primarily to ease the financial burden of “Home Charges.” These were massive, mandatory sterling-denominated annual remittances sent from the Government of India to Britain to cover military costs, administrative expenditure, interest on public debt, and British officials’ pensions.
- Mechanics of the Peg: By keeping the Rupee artificially strong against the British Pound/Sterling, the colonial government required fewer domestic rupees to purchase the sterling required for these international transfers. This systematically balanced the colonial budget, prevented massive deficits, and ensured that India could comfortably service its London-issued debt, maintaining its international financial creditworthiness.
Macroeconomic Impacts and Nationalist Opposition
- Impact on Importers: While a highly valued currency naturally makes imports cheaper (favoring British manufacturers like Lancashire textile exporters sending goods into India), supporting Indian importers was not the driving structural motive of the colonial state’s macroeconomic policy.
- Destruction of Exports: An overvalued currency acts as a direct penalty on domestic producers. The 1s 6d ratio made Indian agricultural goods and raw materials—such as cotton produce—significantly more expensive and uncompetitive in the global market.
- The National Backlash: This sparked the famous “Ratio Controversy” of the late 1920s and 1930s. Indian nationalists, industrialists (led by figures like G.D. Birla and Purshottamdas Thakurdas), and the Indian National Congress fiercely resisted the rate, arguing that the British were engineering a deliberate deflationary drain of Indian wealth to safeguard London’s treasury at the cost of Indian farmers and domestic industries.
Historical Evolution of Currency Committees in British India
| Year | Commission / Committee Name | Core Focus / Outcome | Key Policy Recommendation |
| 1893 | Herschell Committee | Closure of Mints to free silver. | Recommended the suspension of the free coinage of silver to arrest the continuous drop in the rupee’s international value, paving the way for a gold standard interface. |
| 1898 | Fowler Committee | Institutionalizing the Gold Standard. | Formally declared India’s currency baseline to be a Gold Exchange Standard, making the British sovereign gold coin legal tender in India at a fixed rate of 1s 4d per rupee. |
| 1913 | Chamberlain Commission | Review of Gold Standard performance. | Evaluated the gold exchange standard mechanics; famously included John Maynard Keynes as a member, who defended the state-managed paper currency backed by sterling reserves in London. |
| 1919 | Babington Smith Committee | Post-WWI currency stabilization. | Recommended fixing the exchange rate at an unsustainably high level of 2s 0d gold per rupee due to the post-war surge in silver prices, causing severe economic disruption and draining India’s gold reserves when the government tried to defend it. |
| 1926 | Hilton-Young Commission | Structural currency overhaul. | Recommended the Gold Bullion Standard (currency convertible to gold bullion, not gold coins), fixed the controversial 1s 6d exchange rate, and proposed the structural framework for creating the Reserve Bank of India. |
